Informational Flow Implies Informational Pause

  • Marc Champagne
Part of the Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind book series (SHPM, volume 19)


In the previous chapter, I tried to keep ordinary colour perception from being philosophically dismissed. In this chapter, I want to argue that countenancing such qualities at a fundamental level is more promising than waiting for those qualities to emerge at higher levels of complexity. Although complex patterns are crucial to the deployment of neuroscientific and psychological explanations, prescission allows us to artificially decompose those patterns into simple qualities which, owing to their radical isolation from all relations, elude all scientific scrutiny. I argue that, so long as humans have this ability to prescind, worries about phenomenal consciousness will resurface. I thus try to demystify our powers of prescission by examining the Game of Life setting. Philosophers of mind like Daniel Dennett have used this setting to explain intentional explanation, but I think it can also be used to explain how we arrive at the idea of qualia.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marc Champagne
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTrent UniversityPeterboroughCanada

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