Seeing Things as They Are

  • Marc Champagne
Part of the Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind book series (SHPM, volume 19)


In the previous chapter, I added similarity-based signs or icons to the standard menu of referential options. In this chapter, I want to explore the ramifications of this addition for perception. Peirce saw good reason to push his prescissive analysis of iconicity down to a single quality. I thus contrast his account with that of John Poinsot, a medieval philosopher who held that a sign always retains a slight distinction between the object it signifies and the vehicle that does the signifying. Because iconic merger gives us a way to vindicate ordinary perception, I favour Peirce’s stance. The resulting view goes against the claim, put forward by John Locke, that the “secondary” qualities we experience are mere figments. I therefore do my best to undermine that Lockean worldview. Although some philosophers believe that putting qualities back into the world results in panpsychism, I try to find a less far-fetched way to express this.


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© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marc Champagne
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTrent UniversityPeterboroughCanada

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