Abstract
In the previous chapter, I added similarity-based signs or icons to the standard menu of referential options. In this chapter, I want to explore the ramifications of this addition for perception. Peirce saw good reason to push his prescissive analysis of iconicity down to a single quality. I thus contrast his account with that of John Poinsot, a medieval philosopher who held that a sign always retains a slight distinction between the object it signifies and the vehicle that does the signifying. Because iconic merger gives us a way to vindicate ordinary perception, I favour Peirce’s stance. The resulting view goes against the claim, put forward by John Locke, that the “secondary” qualities we experience are mere figments. I therefore do my best to undermine that Lockean worldview. Although some philosophers believe that putting qualities back into the world results in panpsychism, I try to find a less far-fetched way to express this.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsReferences
Aho T (2014) Sense perception: early modern theories. In: Knuuttila S, Sihvola J (eds) Sourcebook for the history of the philosophy of mind: philosophical psychology from Plato to Kant, Studies in the history of philosophy of mind, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 81–104
Albertazzi L (2012) Qualitative perceiving. J Conscious Stud 19(11–12):6–31
Allen K (2016) A naïve realist theory of colour. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Aristotle (1993) De anima (trans: Hamlyn DW). Clarendon, Oxford
Armstrong DM (1999) The mind-body problem: an opinionated introduction. Westview Press, Boulder
Balibar E (2013) Identity and difference: John Locke and the invention of consciousness (trans: Montag W). Verso, London
Bayne T (2004) Closing the gap? Some questions for neurophenomenology. Phenomenol Cogn Sci 3(4):349–364
Beuchot M, Deely JN (1995) Common sources for the semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot. Rev Metaphys 48(3):539–566
Boler JF (2004) Peirce and medieval thought. In: Misak C (ed) The Cambridge companion to Peirce. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 58–86
Byrne A, Hilbert D (2003) Color realism and color science. Behav Brain Sci 26(1):3–21
Carruthers P (2000) Phenomenal consciousness: a naturalistic theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Chalmers DJ (2015) Panpsychism and panprotopsychism. In: Alter T, Nagasawa Y (eds) Consciousness in the physical world: essays on Russellian monism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 246–276
Champagne M (2015) Disjunctivism and the ethics of disbelief. Philos Pap 44(2):139–163
Churchland PM (1996) The engine of reason, the seat of the soul: a philosophical journey into the brain. MIT Press, Cambridge
Colapietro VM (2010) Peirce today. Pragmatism Today 1(2):7–24
Crane T, Mellor DH (1990) There is no question of physicalism. Mind 99(394):185–206
Dalcourt GJ (1994) Poinsot and the mental imagery debate. Mod Sch 72(1):1–12
Davidson DH (2001) Subjective, intersubjective, objective. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Deacon TW (2011) Incomplete nature: how mind emerged from matter. W. W. Norton, New York
Deely JN (1982) Antecedents to Peirce’s notion of iconic signs. In: Lenhart MD, Herzfeld M (eds) Semiotics 1980. Plenum, New York, pp 109–120
Deely JN (1990) Basics of semiotics. Indiana University Press, Bloomington
Deely JN (1994) Locke’s philosophy versus Locke’s proposal for semiotic. Am J Semiot 11(3–4):33–37
Deely JN (2001) Four ages of understanding. University of Toronto Press, Toronto
Deely JN (2003) The word “semiotics”: formation and origins. Semiotica 146(1–4):1–49
Deely JN (2009) Basics of semiotics, 5th edn. Tartu University Press, Tartu
Dodd J (1995) McDowell and identity theories of truth. Analysis 55(3):160–165
Fodor JA (1983) The modularity of mind: an essay on faculty psychology. MIT Press, Cambridge
Furton EJ (1995) A medieval semiotic: reference and representation in John of St. Thomas’ theory of signs. Peter Lang, Bern
Furton EJ (1997) The constitution of the object in Immanuel Kant and John Poinsot. Rev Metaphys 51(1):55–75
Goodman N (1976) Languages of art: an approach to a theory of symbols. Hackett, Indianapolis
Harman G (1990) The intrinsic quality of experience. In: Tomberlin JE (ed) Philosophical perspectives, vol 4. Ridgeview, Atascadero, pp 31–52
Harnad S (2002) Symbol grounding and the origin of language. In: Scheutz M (ed) Computationalism: new directions. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 143–158
Hilbert D (1987) Color and color perception: a study in anthropomorphic realism. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford
Hookway C (2007) Peirce on icons and cognition. In: Priss U, Polovina S, Hill R (eds) Conceptual structures: knowledge architectures for smart applications. Springer, Berlin, pp 59–68
Huxley TH (1866) Lessons in elementary physiology. MacMillan, London
Jackson F (1982) Epiphenomenal qualia. Philos Q 32(127):127–136
Jackson F (1986) What Mary didn’t know. J Philos 83(5):291–295
Jackson F (2004) Postscript on qualia. In: Ludlow P, Nagasawa Y, Stoljar D (eds) There’s something about Mary: essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 417–420
Jacovides M (1999) Locke’s resemblance theses. The Philosophical Review 108(4):461–496
Jacovides M (2007) Locke’s distinctions between primary and secondary qualities. In: Newman L (ed) The Cambridge companion to Locke’s “Essay concerning human understanding”. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 101–129
James W (1975) The meaning of truth. Longmans, Green, and Company, New York
James W (2007) The principles of psychology, vol 2. Cosimo, New York
Johnston M (1992) How to speak of the colours. Philos Stud 68(3):221–263
Kelley D (1988) The evidence of the senses: a realist theory of perception. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge
King P (1994) Scholasticism and the philosophy of mind: the failure of Aristotelian psychology. In: Horowitz T, Janis AI (eds) Scientific failure. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, pp 109–138
Kirkham RL (1997) Theories of truth: a critical introduction. MIT Press, Cambridge
Ladyman J, Ross D, Spurrett D, Collier J (2007) Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Legg C (2013) What is a logical diagram? In: Moktefi A, Shin S-J (eds) Visual reasoning with diagrams. Birkhäuser, Heidelberg, pp 1–18
Levine J (2007) Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraint. In: Alter T, Walter S (eds) Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: new essays on consciousness and physicalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 145–166
Lewtas P (2013) What it is like to be a quark. J Conscious Stud 20(9–10):39–64
Livingston PM (2004) Philosophical history and the problem of consciousness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Locke J (1825) An essay concerning human understanding. Thomas Davison, London
MacFarlane J (2014) Assessment sensitivity: relative truth and its applications. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Marmo C (1987) The semiotics of John Poinsot. Versus 46:109–129
Maroosis J (2003) Poinsot, Peirce, and Pegis: knowing as a way of being. In: Redpath PA (ed) A Thomistic tapestry. Rodopi, Amsterdam, pp 157–176
McDowell J (1996) Mind and world. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
McGinn C (1989) Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98(891):349–366
Murphy JB (1994) Language, communication, and representation in the semiotic of John Poinsot. Thomist 58(4):569–598
Nagel T (2012) Mind and cosmos: why the materialist neo-Darwinian conception of nature is almost certainly false. Oxford University Press, Oxford
O’Dea J (2002) The indexical nature of sensory concepts. Philos Pap 31(2):169–181
Papineau D (2003) Theories of consciousness. In: Smith Q, Jokic A (eds) Consciousness: new philosophical perspectives. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 353–383
Papineau D (2006) Comments on Galen Strawson. In: Strawson G, Freeman A (eds) Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism? Imprint Academic, Exeter, pp 100–109
Papineau D (2007) Phenomenal and perceptual concepts. In: Alter T, Walter S (eds) Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: new essays on consciousness and physicalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 111–144
Peirce CS ( 1931–58) The collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Peirce CS (1998) The essential Peirce: selected philosophical writings, vol 2. Indiana University Press, Bloomington
Peirce CS (2015a) Division of signs. Sign Syst Stud 43(4):651–662
Peirce CS (2015b) Two papers on existential graphs by Charles Peirce. Synthese 192(4):881–922
Pellerey R (1989) Thomas Aquinas: natural semiotics and the epistemological process. In: Eco U, Marmo C (eds) On the medieval theory of signs. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp 81–105
Poinsot J (2013) Tractatus de signis: the semiotic of John Poinsot (trans: Deely JN, Powell RA). St. Augustine’s Press, South Bend
Potrč M (2008) The world of qualia. In: Wright E (ed) The case for qualia. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 109–124
Prinz JJ (2002) Furnishing the mind: concepts and their perceptual basis. MIT Press, Cambridge
Pylyshyn ZW (1984) Computation and cognition: toward a foundation for cognitive science. MIT Press, Cambridge
Quine WVO (1966) The ways of paradox and other essays. Random House, New York
Ransdell JM (1978) A misunderstanding of Peirce’s phenomenology. Philos Phenomenol Res 38(4):550–553
Ransdell JM (1979) The epistemic function of iconicity in perception. In: Ketner KL, Ransdell JM (eds) Studies in Peirce’s semiotic. Institute for studies in pragmaticism, Lubbock, pp 51–66
Ransdell JM (2003) Iconicity revisited. Semio Inq 23(1–3):221–240
Rasmussen DB (1994) The significance for cognitive realism of the thought of John Poinsot. American Catholic Philos Q 68(3):409–424
Rosenthal DM (2010) How to think about mental qualities. Philosophical Issues 20:368–393
Runes DD (ed) (1980) Dictionary of philosophy: ancient, medieval, modern. Littlefield, Totowa
Russell B (2015) My philosophical development. In: Alter T, Nagasawa Y (eds) Consciousness in the physical world: essays on Russellian monism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 46–57
Santaella L (2003) Why there is no crisis of representation, according to Peirce. Semiotica 143(1–4):45–52
Searle JR (1980) Minds, brains, and programs. Behav Brain Sci 3(3):417–424
Sebeok TA, Danesi M (2000) The forms of meaning: modeling systems theory and semiotic analysis. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin
Sellars W (1991) Science, perception and reality. Ridgeview, Atascadero
Shoemaker S (1994) Self-knowledge and inner-sense; lecture III: the phenomenal character of experience. Philos Phenomenol Res 54(2):291–314
Strawson G (2006) Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism? Imprint Academic, Exeter
Stroud-Drinkwater C (1994) The naive theory of colour. Philos Phenomenol Res 54(2):345–354
Sundström P (2007) Colour and consciousness: untying the metaphysical knot. Philos Stud 136(2):123–165
Tiercelin C (2006) The importance of the medievals in the constitution of Peirce’s semeiotic and thought-sign theory. In: Fabbrichesi R, Marietti S (eds) Semiotics and philosophy in Charles Sanders Peirce. Cambridge Scholars, Newcastle upon Tyne, pp 158–184
Tootell RBH, Silverman MS, Switkes E, Valois RLD (1982) Deoxyglucose analysis of retinotopic organization in primate striate cortex. Science 218(4575):902–904
Tye M (1995) Ten problems of consciousness: a representational theory of the phenomenal mind. MIT Press, Cambridge
Tye M (2000) Consciousness, color, and content. MIT Press, Cambridge
Violi P (2007) Semiosis without consciousness? An ontogenetic perspective. Cogn Semiot 1:65–88
Weinberg S (2016) Consciousness in Locke. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Wild J (1947) An introduction to the phenomenology of signs. Philos Phenomenol Res 8(2):217–233
Wittgenstein L (2002) Tractatus logico-philosophicus (trans: Ogden CK, Ramsey FP). Routledge, London
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Champagne, M. (2018). Seeing Things as They Are. In: Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 19. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73338-8_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73338-8_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-73337-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-73338-8
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)