Abstract
Unlike Argentina, Mexico has been devastated by illegal drugs. Over the last decade, approximately 100,000 people have died in the so-called war on drugs, and close to 36,000 have disappeared and are presumed dead. This chapter strudies the "human tragedy" of Mexican´s war on drugs. It estimate the size of its domestic market and the effects of criminal diversification. It finishes with a set of hypotheses that explain the effects of the illegal drug business on the severe deterioration of citizen security in this country.
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Notes
- 1.
Mexico has experienced other waves of violence. In the early twentieth century, the Mexican Revolution yielded an estimated one million casualties over two decades.
- 2.
The dependable “drug violence in Mexico ” report states: “While important methodological issues hinder data compilation on organized crime-related killings, tallies produced over the past decade by the government, media, academia, NGOs and private consultants suggest that between roughly one-third and half of all homicides in Mexico bear signs of organized crime-style violence, including high-caliber automatic weapons, torture, dismemberment, and explicit messages involving organized-crime groups.” https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017_DrugViolenceinMexico.pdf page 5.
- 3.
The particularly vicious and cruel methods of gangs and hit men require a special examination that transcends this book. A very succinct analysis shows that this type of violence can be explained from three different perspectives: A) gangs and DTOs use cruelty as a “rite of passage” for new young recruits to the extent they want to belong (those who want to be members need to prove their willingness to engage in gruesome executions). B) The use of extreme violence is instrumental and used to intimidate rivals (members from one gang attempt to deter other gangs from getting into a drug business or the fight for turf). C) A culture of violence and revenge deeply entrenched in Mexico erupts when all social and state control mechanisms collapse (violence and revenge was always there, but the social controls that have historically contained them have now deteriorated).
- 4.
Data on penitentiary systems is obtained from INEGI http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/censosgobierno/estatal/cngspspe/2016/.
- 5.
There are two large populations , however, that were not sampled in the surveys and which typically use above-average quantities of drugs: the inmate population and tourists. Both, of course, account for additional share of the overall demand, and I will provide estimates of their impact.
- 6.
For the cohort aged 15–64, past-year use rates in Europe and many countries in the Americas are higher. For instance, past-year prevalence of marijuana around 2010 was 14.6% in Italy, 10.6% in Spain, 8.7% in France, 13.7 in the United States, 7.6% in Argentina, and 6.7% in Chile (Mexico had less than 2%). For cocaine, past-year use was 2.6% in Spain, 2.2% in Italy, 2.6% in Argentina, 2.4% in the United States, and 2.4% in Chile (for Mexico, it was less than 1%). For and international comparison of the data, see http://www.conadic.salud.gob.mx/pdfs/ENA_2011_DROGAS_ILICITAS_.pdf pages 121–122.
- 7.
The 2016 survey indicates that only 1% of adults 35–65 have used any drug over the last year (for the entire population aged 12–65, this rate was 2.7%); see ENCODAT (2017).
- 8.
As with most prevalence rates derived from survey, underreporting affects the findings. To estimate the market size, I will make adjustments to take this into account.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
ENCODAT (2017).
- 12.
In the last chapter, using available data for Argentina, the use rate or cocaine was the following: once during the past year 10.5% (32.1% for crack), several times during the past year 54.3% (40% for crack), and weekly or daily 35.1% (25.9% for crack).
- 13.
This will be explained below. The basic assumption is that since demand stems from individual use reported in surveys, these are already non-pure drugs. I will apply street prices to the overall demand.
- 14.
Anuario estadĂstico y geográfico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 2016, Chap. 2. INEGI 2016 inegi.org.mx.
- 15.
The most well known are cocaine and smokable types (i.e., crack).
- 16.
The ratio for the 2011 survey was 30% and for 2008, 26.9%. This is estimated from ENCODAT (2017) in Fig. 1. In short, it is quite a similar ratio.
- 17.
This represents approximately 0.9% of the population aged 12–65. It is probably rising since in the 2011 survey, 0.6% of the population reported the use of cocaine during the past year and for the 2008 survey, 0.5%. See http://www.conadic.salud.gob.mx/pdfs/ENA_2011_DROGAS_ILICITAS_.pdf page 43.
- 18.
In Spain, light users take cocaine 12.5Â days per year on average, using 0.55Â g per day. Heavy users take 0.8Â g per day 125Â days per year (on average).
- 19.
Underreporting is most likely to be found among light users but not as common among heavy users. Therefore, the true underreporting will imply much less than 6 MT.
- 20.
Within the safe assumption that the Mexican pure cocaine domestic market does not exceed 15 MT and the US domestic market exceeds 300 MT.
- 21.
The equivalent to US$12 is the official response to an information request from the PGR (Mexican district attorney) (http://www.sisi.org.mx/jspsi/documentos/2014/seguimiento/00017/0001700000114_065.pdf). In an English translation of Hope’s blog, the price is estimated at US$34, based on reports from a captured Zeta leader. See (http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/what-a- zetas -confessions-say-about-mexicos-internal-drug-market.
- 22.
https://data.unodc.org/#state:1 ENA p. 27.
- 23.
In a previous chapter, mention was made of the growing use of cannabis in oils and other edible forms; however, smoking is the most common way of using this particular drug.
- 24.
This estimate, as we have done for cocaine, will not be adjusted for purity, or in this case, for the THC level. It is based on average retail prices.
- 25.
Based on Hope’s figures, the export market can be estimated at MXN$89 million. Others report very high figures between MSN$19 and 29 billion in revenues http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2016/08/19/los-carteles-del-narcotrafico-mas-importantes-de-mexico/ drawn from the US Justice Department, but a study by the RAND corporation (reported by Patrik Radden Keefe in The New York Times on June 15, 2012) has estimated that Mexican DTOs earned at least US$6.9 billion in 2012, though the true figure is probably higher.
- 26.
Some of the following arguments are extracted from an in-depth analysis I developed in Bergman 2016, Chap. 6.
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Bergman, M. (2018). Mexico. In: Illegal Drugs, Drug Trafficking and Violence in Latin America. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73153-7_10
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