Abstract
This chapter examines mainstream institutionalist theories and concludes that they rely on mechanisms that only exert explanatory power in institutionalised settings. Specifically, rational choice institutionalism relies on explanatory frameworks that become meaningful predictors of behaviour in settings where interests are crystallised and the rules of the game are set. The same can be said for historical institutionalism’s reliance on explanatory variables suited to explain events in circumstances where institutions are settled and have a recognised tradition. Lastly, sociological institutionalism suffers from a similar limitation as it is premised on the existence of institutions vested with agency. Overall, established institutionalist theories assume the presence of institutionalisation, have developed explanatory mechanisms premised on it, and cannot account for institutionalisation in emerging democracies.
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Notes
- 1.
Over -institutionalised should not be confused with fully institutionalised. Over -institutionalised are those institutions that are too slow, bureaucratic, and unresponsive to the evolving situations making timely and effective decision-making difficult.
- 2.
I am aware that from the twentieth century on the state has been increasingly pervasive. In this case I refer to moments of political transformations during which the power of the state is truncated and its reach limited.
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Gjevori, E. (2018). Mainstream Institutionalist Approaches. In: Democratisation and Institutional Reform in Albania. New Perspectives on South-East Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73071-4_3
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