Abstract
It is argued with Immanuel Kant that we as human beings ought to unify ourselves as efficacious, autonomous and creative beings, and that moral education is an open-ended and never-ending process. It is also argued that we wilfully deviate from unifying ourselves in the terms mentioned above due to our imperfect rational nature. This, however, does not suggest that we should not be able to unify ourselves in the terms suggested. On the contrary, the efforts to render ourselves efficacious, autonomous and creative should remain. It seems, however, that education in present times influences children and young people to render themselves efficacious with regard to specific desired ends, as well as being loyal and morally committed to how things stand, instead of making it possible for them to unify themselves in the above-mentioned sense. Education is therefore not an open-ended and never-ending process in moral terms.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See Guyer 2014b, for a discussion on this.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
See also Guyer, (2006) for a discussion on three different interpretations of the free play between imagination and understanding, namely the precognitive, the multicognitive and the metacognitive approach, which Guyer defends. The precognitive approach suggests that ‘free play’ means playing around with images which would not be constrained by any determinate concepts, and the multicognitive approach suggests that ‘free play’ means playing around with concepts which would not be determined or constrained by any determinate concepts, which Guyer argues are dubious (see 2006, p. 178). He argues instead that “the only way we can understand Kant’s account of the free play of the cognitive powers consistently with our own and his assumptions about the determinacy of the objects of aesthetic judgment, as well as with his assumption about the judgmental and therefore object-referring structure of consciousness itself, is by replacing the precognitive and multicognitive approaches with what I will now call a ‘metacognitive’ approach. [And Guyer continues:] On such an approach, the free and harmonious play of imagination and understanding should be understood as a state of mind in which the manifold of intuition induced by the perception of an object and presented by the imagination to the understanding is recognized to satisfy the rules for the organization of that manifold dictated by the determinate concept or concepts on which our recognition and identification of the object of this experience depends. It is also a state of mind in which it is felt that – or as if – the understanding’s underlying objective or interest in unity is being satisfied in a way that goes beyond anything required for or dictated by satisfaction of the determinate concept or concepts on which mere identification of the object depends.” (Guyer 2006, pp. 182–183)
- 6.
- 7.
See also Munzel 1999 for a discussion on the value of cultivating reflective judgment in education and elsewhere.
- 8.
See Korsgaard 2008, 2009, where she develops a view of agency in terms of efficacy and autonomy, but not creativity, with regard to Kant’s principles of practical reason, namely the hypothetical and categorical imperative; see Kant 1998b, in particular Section II for a discussion on these principles.
- 9.
See also Roth 2014 for a discussion on this and similar issues.
- 10.
See Guyer 2000b for a discussion on morally permissible ends.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
See also Korsgaard 2009, in particular Chapter 4.4, for a similar argument.
- 14.
See Dewey’s German Philosophy and Politics, 1915/1979 in which he strangely argues that Kant defends the idea that those who do their duty submit themselves to the will of others and follow their orders. It seems that Dewey mistakenly associated duty with heteronomy instead of autonomy, and that he therefore thinks that Kant defends the absurd idea that doing one’s duty consists in following orders, and hence not thinking for oneself, from the standpoint of the other, and consistently; see also Campbell 2004 and Johnston 2006 for critical discussions on Dewey’s reception of German philosophy in general and Kant’s in particular in his German Philosophy and Politics.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
See also Surprenant 2014 for a discussion on the value of cultivating virtue in education and elsewhere in Kantian terms.
References
Allison, H. E. (1995). Kant’s theory of freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Allison, H. E. (2001). Kant’s theory of taste. A reading of the critique of aesthetic judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baxley, A. M. (2005). The practical significance of taste in Kant’s “Critique of Judgment”: Love of natural beauty as a mark of moral character. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 63(1), 33–45.
Biesta, G. (2010). Good education in an age of measurement – Ethics, politics, democracy. London/New York: Routledge.
Bruno, P. M. (2010). Kant’s concept of genius. its origin and function in the third critique, Continuum studies in philosophy. London: Continuum.
Campell, J. (2004). Dewey and German philosophy in wartime. Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society, 40(1), 1–20.
Collins, L. (1997). From the lectures of Professor Kant, Königsberg, Winter Semester, 1784-5, In Lectures on ethics (P. Heath, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crowther, P. (2010). The Kantian aesthetic. From knowledge to the Avant-Garde. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deligiorgi, K. (2002). Universalisability, publicity, and communication: Kant’s conception of reason. European Journal of Philosophy, 10(2), 143–159.
Dewey, J. (1915/1979). German philosophy and politics. In J. A. Boydston (Ed.), John Dewey, The middle works, 1899–1924 (Vol. 8, pp. 135–204). Carbondale/Dewardsville: Southern Illinois University Press.
Guyer, P. (1997). Kant and the claims of taste. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Guyer, P. (2000a). Editor’s introduction. In Immanuel Kant, Critique of the power of judgment (pp. xiii–lii), edited by Paul Guyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Guyer, P. (2000b). Nature, freedom, and happiness: The third proposition of Kant’s idea for a universal history. In his Kant on freedom, law, and happiness (pp. 372–407). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Guyer, P. (2005). The symbols of freedom in Kant’s aesthetics. In his Values of beauty – Historical essays in aesthetics (pp. 222–241). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Guyer, P. (2006). The harmony of the faculties revisited. In R. Kukla (Ed.), Aesthetics and cognition in Kant’s critical philosophy (pp. 162–193). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Guyer, P. (2014a). Kant. London: Routledge.
Guyer, P. (2014b). Examples of perfectionism. Journal of Aesthetic Education, 48(3), 5–27.
Herman, B. (2007). Training to autonomy: Kant and the question of moral education. In her Moral literacy (pp. 130–153). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Johnston, J. S. (2006). Dewey’s critique of Kant. Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society, 42(4), 518–551.
Johnston, J. S. (2013). Kant’s philosophy – A study for educators. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing.
Kant, I. (1996a). The metaphysics of morals, edited by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (1996b). An answer to the question: What is enlightenment? In M. J. Gregor (Ed.), Practical philosophy (pp. 17–22). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (1997) Critique of practical reason, edited by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (1998a). In P. Guyer & A. W. Wood (Eds.), Critique of pure reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (1998b). In M. J. Gregor (Ed.), Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (1998c). In A. W. Wood & G. di Giovanni (Eds.), Religion within the boundaries of mere reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (2000) Critique of the power of judgment, edited by Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (2006). In R. B. Louden (Ed.), Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (2007). Lectures on pedagogy. In G. Zöller & R. B. Louden (Eds.), Anthropology, history, and education (pp. 434–485). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (2009). Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim. In E. O. Rorty & J. Schmidt (Eds.), Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim – A critical guide (pp. 9–23). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Korsgaard, C. (1996). Kant’s formula of humanity. In her Creating the kingdom of ends (pp. 106–132). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Korsgaard, C. (2004). Fellow creatures: Kantian ethics and our duties to animals, The Tanner lectures on human values. Delivered at University of Michigan, USA, February 6, 2004.
Korsgaard, C. (2008). The constitution of agency: Essays on practical reason and moral psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Korsgaard, C. (2009). Self-constitution: Agency, identity, and integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lingard, B., Martino, W., & Rezai-Rashti, G. (Eds.). (2015). Testing regimes, accountabilities and education policy. London: Routledge.
Louden, R. (2011). Becoming human: Kant and the philosophy of education. In his Kant’s human being – Essays on his theory of human nature (pp. 136–150). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Merritt, M. (2009). Reflection, enlightenment, and the significance of spontaneity in Kant. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 17(5), 981–1010.
Moran, K. A. (2012). Moral education and moral progress. In her Community and progress in Kant’s moral philosophy (pp. 127–167). Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
Munzel, G. F. (1999). Kant’s conception of moral character – The critical link of morality, anthropology, and reflective judgment. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Munzel, G. F. (2012). Kant’s conception of pedagogy – Toward education for freedom. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Rönnström, N. (2012). From globalist to cosmopolitan learning: on the reflexive modernization of teacher education. Ethics & Global Politics, 5(4), 193–216.
Rönnström, N. (2015). Educating competitive teachers for a competitive nation? Policy Futures in Education, 13(6), 732–750.
Roth, K. (2011). Understanding agency and educating character. Educational Theory, 61(3), 257–274.
Roth, K. (2012a). Freedom and autonomy in knowledge-based societies. In K. Roth & C. W. Surprenant (Eds.), Kant and education – Interpretations and commentary (pp. 214–225). New York/London: Routledge.
Roth, K. (2012b). A cosmopolitan design of teacher education and a progressive orientation towards the highest good. Ethics & Global Politics, 5(4), 259–279.
Roth, K. (2014). Making ourselves intelligible – Rendering ourselves efficacious and autonomous, without fixed ends. Journal of Aesthetic Education, 48(3), 28–40.
Roth, K. (2015). The role of examples, current designs and ideas for a cosmopolitan design of education. Policy Futures in Education, 13(6), 763–774.
Roth, K., & Selander, S. (2008). Introduction: Changed conditions for identity formation, communication and learning. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 27(4), 207–209.
Roth, K., & Surprenant, C. W. (Eds.). (2012). Kant and education – Interpretations and commentary. New York/London: Routledge.
Siegel, H. (1988). Educating reason – Rationality, critical thinking and education. New York: Routledge.
Smith, W. (Ed.). (2016). The global testing culture: Shaping education policy, perceptions and practice. Oxford: Symposium Books.
Surprenant, C. W. (2014). Moral education and the cultivation of virtue. In his Kant and the cultivation of virtue (pp. 76–107). New York and London: Routledge.
Wahlström, N. (2015). Transnational policy discourses on teacher education: A cosmopolitan perspective. Policy Futures in Education, 13(6), 801–816.
Wood, A. W. (1970). Kant’s moral religion. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Wood, A. W. (2010). Kant and the intelligibility of evil. In S. Anderson-Gold & P. Muchnik (Eds.), Kant’s anatomy of evil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Roth, K. (2018). Unifying Ourselves As Efficacious, Autonomous and Creative Beings – Kant on Moral Education As a Process Without Fixed Ends. In: Smeyers, P. (eds) International Handbook of Philosophy of Education. Springer International Handbooks of Education. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72761-5_19
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72761-5_19
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-72759-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-72761-5
eBook Packages: EducationEducation (R0)