Competition and Coordination in Single-Supplier Multiple-Retailer Supply Chain

  • Jiahang Du
  • Quansheng Lei
Conference paper
Part of the Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics book series (SPBE)


We analyze a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a single supplier and multiple retailers. The retailers make sales effort to attract the potential costumers. The retail channels compete in price at the end market. We find out the equilibrium solution in centralized case and decentralized case. Then we analyze the effect of total supply chain profit with respect to effort level. We show that the supply chain efficiency decreases and then weakly increases as the number of retailer increases. We also coordinate the supply chain with two-part tariff mechanism and find out the corresponding parameters. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate our model.


Dual-channel Effort level Multiple retailers Two-part tariff mechanism 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Beijing University of Posts and TelecommunicationsBeijingP. R. China

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