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What Went Wrong When Regulating Private Maritime Security Companies

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Operational Law in International Straits and Current Maritime Security Challenges

Part of the book series: Operational Maritime Law ((OPMAL,volume 1))

Abstract

When regulating private maritime security companies arose as a pressing issue in 2012, a number of key actors made a conceptual choice that turned out to be a mistake. The discussion centered on whether private maritime security companies (PMSCs) were primarily a subset of the security industry or the maritime industry. At the time, PMSCs’ principal activity was to provide armed guards on ships transiting the High Risk Area off Somalia. Since they were then considered necessary supernumeraries to the crews of commercial vessels, representatives of the shipowners won the argument that PMSCs should be treated as part of the broader maritime industry. The main regulatory initiatives, therefore, were divorced from existing private security accountability initiatives and were developed in such a way as to suit the needs of commercial vessels in transit. This approach, however, has proved shortsighted. Even after the first successful attacks in 5 years, armed transits off Somalia are a fraction of what they used to be in terms of both frequency and financial value. But the PMSCs that have survived this bust period have sought and found work performing other services in the maritime space. Unfortunately, however, those activities are generally not covered by the regulatory initiatives that were produced under the erroneous notion that private maritime security companies are more maritime service providers than security service providers. The consequence, therefore, is that the private maritime security industry, as it currently operates, is largely unregulated.

To understand the nature of this accountability gap, it is necessary to review (1) the private security regulatory initiatives that were rejected when addressing PMSCs, (2) what has been done to regulate PMSCs specifically, and (3) what PMSCs are now doing. Only then can this analysis really delve into why current measures do not adequately cover the private maritime security industry.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Thurnher (2008) and Scahill (2007).

  2. 2.

    Apuzzo (2014a).

  3. 3.

    Apuzzo (2014b).

  4. 4.

    Wiese Bockmann and Katz (2012).

  5. 5.

    BBC News (2012).

  6. 6.

    Mitra (2016).

  7. 7.

    BBC News (2013).

  8. 8.

    Maritime Executive (2017).

  9. 9.

    Seatrade Maritime News (2013).

  10. 10.

    Percy (2007).

  11. 11.

    Mlinarcik (2006).

  12. 12.

    Chesterman (2011).

  13. 13.

    Participating States of the Montreux Document (2017): inter alia Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Russia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States (see:, International Committee of the Red Cross).

  14. 14.

    Ralby (2016).

  15. 15.

    Overview of the Montreux Document (2017).

  16. 16.

    Overview of the Montreux Document (2017).

  17. 17.

    Montreux Document (2008).

  18. 18.

    Montreux Document (2008), Preface ¶ 5.

  19. 19.

    Participating States of the Montreux Document (2017).

  20. 20.

    Wilton Park (2009).

  21. 21.

    ICoC (2010).

  22. 22.

    United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011).

  23. 23.

    IPOA, BAPSC, PASA (2009).

  24. 24.

    ICoC (2010), ¶ 13.

  25. 25.

    ICoC (2010), Definitions.

  26. 26.

    The author was involved in the drafting and can speak to the mindset of the drafters at the time; this is not speculation or inference.

  27. 27.

    ICoC (2010), ¶ 7.

  28. 28.

    Ralby (2011).

  29. 29.

    Articles of Association of the International Code of Conduct Association (2013).

  30. 30.

    International Code of Conduct Association, Certification Procedures (2016).

  31. 31.

    Siegel (2011).

  32. 32.

    Ralby (2015a).

  33. 33.

    Website of the International Maritime Organization, About IMO, July (2014). http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx. Accessed 7 Jul 2017.

  34. 34.

    IMO Private Armed Security (2017).

  35. 35.

    Best Management Practices (2011), 8.15.

  36. 36.

    IMO Private Armed Security (2017).

  37. 37.

    IMO Interim Guidance to Private Maritime Security Companies (2012).

  38. 38.

    IMO Private Armed Security (2017).

  39. 39.

    DeWinter-Schmitt (2014). (“Two key issues neglected in the ISO/PAS 28007 are the responsibility of maritime security companies to respect human rights and to carry out human rights due diligence processes. There is also no mention of conducting human rights risk analyses or engaging with affected communities and stakeholders during that process. In fact, there is no mention that maritime security operations can potentially impact on human rights. Furthermore, there are no stipulations for human rights trainings for personnel, and the requirements for grievance mechanisms are inadequate. While there is a provision that no one under 18 should be employed to carry weapons, there is no reference to avoiding the worst forms of child labor or other gross human rights violations. The ISO/PAS 28007 is simply not a human rights standard.”).

  40. 40.

    DeWinter-Schmitt (2015). (“While these [human rights] additions warrant recognition, there is still room for strengthening the human rights provisions of the IS0 28007-1 if it is to truly reflect the [UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights].”).

  41. 41.

    DeWinter-Schmitt (2015).

  42. 42.

    Ralby (2015b).

  43. 43.

    Drew and McLoghlin (2016).

  44. 44.

    Quartz (2016).

  45. 45.

    Bennett (2015).

  46. 46.

    Splash 24/7 (2016).

  47. 47.

    Information gleaned from interviews in country, plus company’s promotional material.

  48. 48.

    Kinsey et al. (2009).

  49. 49.

    Houreld (2011) and Mazzetti and Schmitt (2011).

  50. 50.

    The Hidden Paw (2009).

  51. 51.

    Information gleaned from interviews in the region.

  52. 52.

    Sengupta (2008).

  53. 53.

    Data taken from interviews with private maritime security companies regarding their interaction with floating armories.

  54. 54.

    Black (2013).

  55. 55.

    Anandan (2013).

  56. 56.

    Subramani (2014).

  57. 57.

    Quoted in Id.

  58. 58.

    Selvaraj (2016).

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Correspondence to Ian M. Ralby .

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Ralby, I.M. (2018). What Went Wrong When Regulating Private Maritime Security Companies. In: Schildknecht, J., Dickey, R., Fink, M., Ferris, L. (eds) Operational Law in International Straits and Current Maritime Security Challenges. Operational Maritime Law, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72718-9_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72718-9_9

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