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Voluntary Pension System

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Simple Models of Income Redistribution
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Abstract

This chapter adds a voluntary pension system to the proportional pension system studied in Chapter 5. Emphasizing the generally neglected tax expenditure on matching voluntary savings, we obtain a much more nuanced picture about the socially optimal value of the matching rate and the cap on the voluntary matched saving.

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Correspondence to András Simonovits .

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Simonovits, A. (2018). Voluntary Pension System. In: Simple Models of Income Redistribution. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72502-4_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72502-4_8

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-72501-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-72502-4

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