Abstract
This chapter adds a voluntary pension system to the proportional pension system studied in Chapter 5. Emphasizing the generally neglected tax expenditure on matching voluntary savings, we obtain a much more nuanced picture about the socially optimal value of the matching rate and the cap on the voluntary matched saving.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Baily, M. N., & Kirkegaard, J. F. (2009). US Pension Reform: Lessons from other Countries. Washington, DC: Petersons Books.
Börsch-Supan, A., Reil-Held, A., & Schunk, D. (2008). Saving Incentives, Old-Age Provision and Displacement Effects: Evidence from the Recent German Pension Reform. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 7, 295–319.
Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B., & Metrick, A. (2004). For Better or Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Saving Behavior. In D. Wise (Ed.), Perspectives in the Economics of Aging (pp. 81–121). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Diamond, P., & Kőszegi, B. (2003). Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting and Retirement. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 1839–1872.
Engen, E. M., Gale, W. G., & Scholz, J. (1996). The Illusory Effects of Saving Incentives on Saving. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(4), 111–138.
Fehr, H., & Habermann, C. (2010). Private Retirement Savings and Mandatory Annuatization. International Tax and Public Finance, 17, 640–661.
Fehr, H., Habermann, C., & Kindermann, F. (2008). Tax-Favored Retirement Accounts: Are They Efficient in Increasing Savings and Growth? FinanzArchiv, Public Finance Analysis, 64, 171–198.
Findley, T. S., & Caliendo, F. N. (2009). Short Horizons, Time Inconsistency, and Optimal Social Security. International Tax and Public Finance, 16, 487–513.
Hinz, R., Holzmann, R., Tuesta, D., & Takayama, N. (2013). Matching Contributions for Pensions. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Homburg, S. (2006). Coping with Rational Prodigal: A Theory of Social Security and Saving Subsidies. Economica, 73, 47–58.
Hubbard, R. G., & Skinner, J. S. (1996). Assessing the Effectiveness of Saving Incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(4), 73–90.
Imrohoroğlu, A., Imrohoroğlu, S., & Joines, D. H. (1995). A Life Cycle Model of Social Security. Economic Theory, 6, 83–114.
Laibson, D. (1997). Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 443–477.
OECD. (2005). Tax-Favored Retirement Saving. OECD Economic Studies (Vol. 39), Paris.
Pfarr, C., & Schneider, U. (2013). Choosing Between Subsidized and Unsubsidized Private Pension Schemes: Evidence from German Panel Data. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 12, 62–91.
Poterba, J. M., Venti, S. F., & Wise, D. A. (1996). How Retirement Saving Program Increase Saving. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(4), 91–112.
Saez, E. (2009). Details Matter: The Impact of Presentation and Information on the Take-Up of Financial Incentives for Retirement Savings. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 1(1), 204–228.
Simonovits, A. (2011). When Are Voluntary Pensions Indifferent? Economics Letters, 111, 153–155.
Thaler, R. H., & Benartzi, S. (2004). Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving. Journal of Political Economy, 112, S164–S187.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Simonovits, A. (2018). Voluntary Pension System. In: Simple Models of Income Redistribution. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72502-4_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72502-4_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-72501-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-72502-4
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)