Abstract
Chapter 3 introduces a little more terminology and examines an argument given by Perry that shows indexical language plays different roles to non-indexical language. It argues that Perry’s discussion specifically concerns rational actions and that this has been inadequately noted or accommodated by the tenseless theory of time, as offered by Mellor. It concludes that tensed and first-personal elements of language play unique roles and that in order to evaluate the implications this has for the philosophy of time we must look more closely at the nature of rational actions.
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Notes
- 1.
In Chap. 9 we will see that matters are a little more complicated than this because the reason an emotion is felt for must also justify having that emotion.
- 2.
Of course, all words can change their meaning or referent over time but such a protracted change of use is not what is at issue here. Rather, indexicals can change their referent without, we might say, changing their use or meaning.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
When I say this I do not mean that the person at issue would in fact be willing to say anything at all. The person might be in hiding. Rather, the point is that s/he would ideally express it by saying “I am making a mess” or s/he would express it that way if s/he were willing to honestly express her/his belief at all. Thus we can say that the belief and the utterance share content (in a broad sense). One might consider the converse of this, such that, when Tom says (honestly etc.) “I am X” or “I believe I am X”, we take this to inform us that Tom has the belief ‘I am X’. Cf. Kripke’s disquotational principle in Kripke (1979).
- 6.
It is worth noting that the mirror is not essential to such a point, e.g., when a number of people put their hands together in the centre of a circle it is possible for people to fail to recognize their hand as their own. Cf. Boer and Lycan (1980).
- 7.
Castaneda (1966) makes a very similar point, though concerning ‘he himself’ rather than ‘I’. This is merely a shift of perspective because the use of ‘he himself’ considered is essentially that of attributing first-personal beliefs to another. E.g., we say Tom has the belief ‘I am F’ or similarly Tom believes he himself to be F. Cf. Castaneda (1967, 1968).
- 8.
Cf. Alvarez (2005, 45).
- 9.
Cf. Anscombe (1957/2000, sect. 5, p. 9).
- 10.
- 11.
Cf. e.g . Dancy (2000).
- 12.
- 13.
If one was inventive s/he could create an example where the states were seen directly rather than simply on a screen, but I’ll spare you this gore.
- 14.
To talk of this ‘presence of experience’ is not to presuppose the tensed theory, rather the phrase is simply used to capture the form of awareness that Mike must have to be moved to act.
- 15.
According to many theories of demonstratives an agent must recognize the referent of a demonstrative to be playing a particular role in a context in order to understand the use of the demonstrative. To this extent perception might commonly be involved in demonstrative reference. E.g., some say you must recognize the referent as the thing demonstrated (e.g. Kaplan (1989a), Reimer (1991a), and perhaps Salmon (2002)), others say that you must recognize it as the most salient thing in the context (e.g. Wettstein (1984), Reimer (1991b)), or as the object of the speaker’s intention in the context (e.g. Kaplan (1989b), Bach (1992a, 1992b)), or as the thing in a particular spatiotemporal relation to the speaker in the context (e.g. McGinn (1981)). (These distinctions are not necessarily exclusive of one another and are rather rough with some proponents falling into more than one group and proponents within one group differing in detail).
- 16.
One is tempted to say simply ‘one can know of what one demonstratively refers to that it is present’, but my opponent of course is not allowed to say this and if s/he doesn’t it is not even clear this argument is at all potent because Mike might well know a belief is simultaneous with a perception of it and be unmoved to act.
- 17.
Most of the views outlined in footnote 15 do not entail that one must directly perceive the referent (cf. Kaplan (1970)).
- 18.
Cf. Le Poidevin (2007).
- 19.
There is thus a temptation to see demonstratives as tensed. Broad (1938, pt. I ch., XXXV, sect. 2.24, p. 305–307) makes this implication by noting that the copula following a demonstrative appears to be tensed.
- 20.
If translation were possible, then this would mean that all indexical language beside first-personal language is in fact tensed language. But, it wouldn’t follow from the fact that some tensed first-personal language can translate all other indexical language that non-tensed non-first-personal language can translate all tensed and all first personal language.
- 21.
Actually Mellor avoids stating this as a biconditional but I think this is a more natural reading and this will not affect my argument.
- 22.
Mellor adopts a token-reflexive theory in (1981) and a date theory in (1998). His shift in view is due to arguments that Smith (e.g. (1993)) has given against the token-reflexive theory. I think that Smith’s arguments are damning of the token-reflexive theory, but I have no need to rely on them here.
- 23.
E.g. Mellor (1981, ch. 6; 1998, ch. 7.4).
- 24.
Let us suppose.
- 25.
It is quite possible to have a tenseless belief for only a short duration. In an unusual moment of inspiration I might consider God’s nature, decide that he is love, and then quickly abandon that idea. Alternatively, I might briefly think to myself that I have thought x at 1 o’clock, then abandon that idea because I was not actually sure whether it was thought x I was having.
- 26.
The arguments of this paragraph and the two that proceed it show that the reference Mellor makes to success semantics in other writings of his does not enable him to avoid the worry that I have raised here (cf. Mellor (2012)).
- 27.
Cf. McGinn (1979) who quite naturally presents a practical syllogism in a third-personal way.
- 28.
I take ‘belief b’ to refer to the relevant first order belief provided by the token-reflexive truth-conditions of B4, e.g., ‘it is 1pm now’. This mode of reference could be taken to be via a demonstrative , name, or description as required.
- 29.
The idea that beliefs about the beliefs we act on play a role in our actions arises in a recent discussion of these matters offered in Mozersky (2006). My presentation of the idea differs from Mozersky’s in a number of ways because Mozersky says that he is just trying to make it coherent how tensed beliefs can play a role in timely actions. We do not find an explanation for the need for tensed beliefs in what he says, rather we get a presentation in which tensed beliefs just are caused by certain things and just do lead to certain inferences and actions (cf. Mozersky (2006, 463)). (Further, one cannot simply infer an explanation form what Mozersky says. Because, e.g., if he is right tensed and tenseless beliefs share content and content is what is at issue in inference, then we have no explanation of why tensed as opposed to tenseless beliefs are needed as premises or arise as conclusions in the inferences present for him in action. But given Mozersky’s goal was to make it coherent that tensed beliefs play these roles, rather than to explain why they must play them, this should not be surprising.)
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Pearson, O.(. (2018). Indexicals & Actions. In: Rationality, Time, and Self. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71973-3_3
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