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Mechanism Design with Efficiency and Equality Considerations

  • Zhou Chen
  • Qi Qi
  • Changjun Wang
  • Wenwei Wang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10660)

Abstract

In this work, we consider the problem of allocating a set of homogenous resources (goods) among multiple strategic players to balance the efficiency and equality from a game-theoretic perspective. For two very general classes of efficiency measures and equality measures, we develop a general truthful mechanism framework which optimally maximizes the resource holder’s efficiency while guaranteeing certain equality levels. We fully characterize the optimal allocation rule. Based on the characterizations, we show the optimal allocation and corresponding truthful payments can be computed in polynomial time, which means the truthful mechanism is computationally feasible.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyClear Water BayHong Kong
  2. 2.Beijing University of TechnologyBeijingChina

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