Limiting User’s Sybil Attack in Resource Sharing

  • Zhou Chen
  • Yukun Cheng
  • Xiaotie Deng
  • Qi Qi
  • Xiang Yan
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10660)


In this work, we discuss the sybil attack to a sharing economic system where each participant contributes its own resource for all to share. We are interested in the robustness of the market equilibrium mechanism in withstanding such an attack, in terms of the incentive ratio to measure how much one could gain by splitting its identity and reconstructing its communication connections with others. On one hand, weshow that no player can increase more than \(\sqrt{2}\) times of their original share from the market equilibrium solution, by characterizing the worst case under which strategic agent can obtain the maximum utility gain after manipulation. On the other hand, such a bound of \(\sqrt{2}\) is proved to be tight by constructing a proper instance, for which this bound is reached.



This research was partially supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (Nos. 11301475, 11426026, 61632017, 61173011), by a Project 985 grant of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, by the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong (ECS Project Nos. 26200314, GRF Project No. 16213115 and GRF Project No. 16243516), and by Ant Finantial.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Zhou Chen
    • 1
  • Yukun Cheng
    • 2
  • Xiaotie Deng
    • 3
  • Qi Qi
    • 1
  • Xiang Yan
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Industrial Engineering and Logistics ManagementThe Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyClear Water BayHong Kong
  2. 2.School of BusinessSuzhou University of Science and TechnologySuzhouChina
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceShanghai Jiao Tong UniversityShanghaiChina

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