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Simple Pricing Schemes for the Cloud

  • Ian A. Kash
  • Peter Key
  • Warut Suksompong
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10660)

Abstract

The problem of pricing the cloud has attracted much recent attention due to the widespread use of cloud computing and cloud services. From a theoretical perspective, several mechanisms that provide strong efficiency or fairness guarantees and desirable incentive properties have been designed. However, these mechanisms often rely on a rigid model, with several parameters needing to be precisely known in order for the guarantees to hold. In this paper, we consider a stochastic model and show that it is possible to obtain good welfare and revenue guarantees with simple mechanisms that do not make use of the information on some of these parameters. In particular, we prove that a mechanism that sets the same price per time step for jobs of any length achieves at least \(50\%\) of the welfare and revenue obtained by a mechanism that can set different prices for jobs of different lengths, and the ratio can be improved if we have more specific knowledge of some parameters. Similarly, a mechanism that sets the same price for all servers even though the servers may receive different kinds of jobs can provide a reasonable welfare and revenue approximation compared to a mechanism that is allowed to set different prices for different servers.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Microsoft ResearchCambridgeUK
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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