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Blurred Lines: Twenty-First Century Maritime Security in the South China Sea

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Eurasia’s Maritime Rise and Global Security

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security ((PSMPS))

Abstract

This chapter explores the South China Sea and how the dividing lines between high and low politics in maritime security have become increasingly indiscernible in the South China Sea, creating a more complex policymaking environment in this contested ocean area. Amid long-standing territorial disputes, two major factors—China’s more assertive foreign policies and a newly acquired military power to back them—have had profound effects on maritime security in the region. The increased frequency of national security encounters with China in the South China Sea has blurred the lines between human, economic, and national security dimensions within the broader category of maritime security. Until the South China Sea disputes are resolved, they will remain in a contested arena where China and others seek to secure and control the vital sea lanes of communication, as well as the region’s untapped natural resources.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Floyd Whaley, “U.S. Reaffirms Defense of Philippines in Standoff with China,” The New York Times, May 1, 2012; Floyd Whaley, “Philippines and China in a Standoff at Sea,” The New York Times, April 11, 2012.

  2. 2.

    Mark Rosen, “Philippine Claims in the South China Sea: A Legal Analysis,” Center for Naval Analyses, https://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IOP-2014-U-008435.pdf (accessed May 3, 2015).

  3. 3.

    For detailed analyses of legal arguments surrounding claims, see Raul Pedrozo, “China versus Vietnam: An Analysis of the Competing Claims in the South China Sea,” Center for Naval Analyses, https://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IOP-2014-U-008433.pdf (accessed May 3, 2015); J. Ashley Roach, “Malaysia and Brunei: An Analysis of their Claims in the South China Sea,” Center for Naval Analyses, https://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IOP-2014-U-008434.pdf (accessed May 3, 2015); Rosen.

  4. 4.

    US Energy Information Administration, “South China Sea,” US Government, http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf (accessed May 5, 2015); Robert Willard, “Press Briefing by NSA for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes and Admiral Robert Willard, U.S. Pacific Command,” White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/13/press-briefing-nsa-strategic-communications-ben-rhodes-and-admiral-rober (accessed May 5, 2015).

  5. 5.

    David Rosenberg and Christopher Chung, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Coordinating Coastal and User State Priorities,” Ocean Development & International Law 39, no. 1 (2008): 58–59.

  6. 6.

    David Michel and Ricky Passarelli, “Sea Change: Evolving Maritime Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Region,” Stimson Center, 25, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/SEA-CHANGE-WEB.pdf (accessed May 3, 2015).

  7. 7.

    Linda Jakobson, “China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors,” Lowy Institute, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/chinas-unpredictable-maritime-security-actors_3.pdf (accessed May 2, 2015), 33; Jeffrey Bader, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael McDevitt, “Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective,” Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/08/south-china-sea-perspective-bader-lieberthal-mcdevitt/south-china-sea-perspective-bader-lieberthal-mcdevitt.pdf (accessed May 2, 2015), 4.

  8. 8.

    Since Taiwan still considers itself the rightful seat of Chinese power, Taipei maintains the same claims as Beijing . While this relationship remains an irritant to Beijing , it likely believes that those islands in the South China Sea occupied by Taiwan will revert to China’s control upon eventual reunification. Because of this special relationship, the remainder of this analysis omits the China-Taiwan territorial disputes.

  9. 9.

    The Philippines still patrols Scarborough Shoal, but since 2012, China has maintained control. Ibid, 4.

  10. 10.

    The nine-dash line has also been referred to as the “cow’s tongue,” “u-shaped line,” and “dotted line.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,” People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml (accessed April 30, 2015); United States Department of State, “Limits in the Seas,” US Government, 1, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf (accessed May 2, 2015).

  11. 11.

    Ibid., 4.

  12. 12.

    Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS): Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm (accessed April 30, 2015); Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – Part VI,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part6.htm (accessed August 5, 2015).

  13. 13.

    “Press Release: The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China),” Permanent Court of Arbitration, https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf

  14. 14.

    David K. Shipler, “Saigon Says Chinese Control Islands, But Refuses to Admit Complete Defeat,” The New York Times, January 21, 1974; Staff, “China and Vietnam Skirmish Over Disputed Island Chain,” The New York Times, March 16, 1988.

  15. 15.

    Philip Shenon, “Manila Sees China Threat On Coral Reef,” The New York Times, February 19, 1995.

  16. 16.

    Philip Shenon, “Rival Claims to Island Chain Bring Edginess to Asia’s Rim,” The New York Times, April 5, 1995.

  17. 17.

    Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Before and After: The South China Sea Transformed,” The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, http://amti.csis.org/before-and-after-the-south-china-sea-transformed/ (accessed May 5, 2015).

  18. 18.

    Simon Denyer, “U.S. Navy alarmed at Beijing’s ‘Great Wall of Sand’ in South China Sea,” The Washington Post, April 1, 2015.

  19. 19.

    China described the civilian facilities as “typhoon shelters, navigation aids, search-and-rescue centers, marine meteorological forecasting stations, fishing services and civil administration offices,” but it did concede that these facilities could also be used for military defense. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Statement on Its Construction in the South China Sea,” The New York Times, April 10, 2015.

  20. 20.

    “Spratly Islands Conflicting Claims,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-conflict.htm (accessed May 5, 2015).

  21. 21.

    China, “China’s Statement on Its Construction in the South China Sea.”

  22. 22.

    Jakobson, 1 and 12.

  23. 23.

    Carlyle A. Thayer, “Indirect Cost Imposition Strategies in the South China Sea: U.S. Leadership and ASEAN Centrality,” Center for New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Maritime%208%20Thayer.pdf (accessed May 3, 2015).

  24. 24.

    Jakobson, 1 and 34.

  25. 25.

    John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 4.

  26. 26.

    Ronald O’Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress,” (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 13.

  27. 27.

    Basil Germond, “The geopolitical dimension of maritime security,” Marine Policy 54 (2015): 139–141.

  28. 28.

    O’Rourke, 12.

  29. 29.

    Euan Graham and Henrick Tsjeng, “Navigating the Indo-Pacific Arc,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Monograph32.pdf (accessed May 2, 2015), 67.

  30. 30.

    China, “Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines.”

  31. 31.

    The Philippines did not assert this claim until 1978. Rosen, iv.

  32. 32.

    Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – Annex VI,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/annex6.htm (accessed August 5, 2015).

  33. 33.

    Jane Perlez, “Beijing Rejects South China Sea Case Ahead of July 12 Ruling,” The New York Times, June 30, 2016; Jane Perlez, “Tribunal Rejects Beijing’s Claims in South China Sea,” The New York Times, July 12, 2016; Staff, “Philippines’ Duterte to Forge Closer Ties With China, Russia,” Associated Press, September 26, 2016.

  34. 34.

    Pedrozo, i.

  35. 35.

    Roach, iii.

  36. 36.

    People’s Republic of China, “Communications received with regard to the submission made by Viet Nam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: China,” United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_vnm_37_2009.htm (accessed May 7, 2015).

  37. 37.

    Trefor Moss, “Malaysia Proposes Joint ASEAN Peacekeeping Force,” Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2015.

  38. 38.

    ASEAN, “1992 ASEAN Declaration On The South China Sea,” National University of Singapore, http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1992%20ASEAN%20Declaration%20on%20the%20South%20China%20Sea-pdf.pdf (accessed May 7, 2015).

  39. 39.

    ASEAN, “1995 Joint Communique Of The 28th Asean Ministerial Meeting,” National University of Singapore, http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1995%20Joint%20Communique%20of%20the%2028th%20ASEAN%20Ministerial%20Meeting-pdf.pdf (accessed May 7, 2015).

  40. 40.

    ASEAN, “Declaration On The Conduct Of Parties In The South China Sea,” ASEAN Secretariat, http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea (accessed May 7, 2015).

  41. 41.

    ASEAN, “Chairman’s Statement Of The 26th ASEAN Summit,” ASEAN Secretariat, http://www.asean.org/images/2015/april/26th_asean_summit/Chairman%20Statement%2026th%20ASEAN%20Summit_final.pdf (accessed May 9, 2015).

  42. 42.

    ASEAN, “ASEAN Political – Security Community,” ASEAN Secretariat, http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community (accessed May 7, 2015).

  43. 43.

    Rosenberg and Chung, 53.

  44. 44.

    Craig Whitlock, “Gates: The U.S. has ‘National Interest’ in Asian Sea Disputes,” The Washington Post, October 12, 2010.

  45. 45.

    Bader, Lieberthal, and McDevitt, 3.

  46. 46.

    This particular assessment was offered by former Admiral Yang Yi, director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at China’s National Defense University. Graham and Tsjeng, 59.

  47. 47.

    Li Xiaokun, “Navigation in South China Sea ‘Not a Problem’,” China Daily, October 23, 2010.

  48. 48.

    Jeremy Page, “China Puts Conciliatory Slant On Land Reclamation,” Wall Street Journal, May 1, 2015.

  49. 49.

    United Nations, “Oceans and the law of the sea, Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/266/26/PDF/N0826626.pdf (accessed May 6, 2015); Germond, “The geopolitical dimension of maritime security,” 137.

  50. 50.

    Christian Bueger, “What is Maritime Security?” Marine Policy 53 (2015): 159–161.

  51. 51.

    This increasing interest was particularly evident during the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. United Nations, “Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development,” United Nations, http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/814UNCSD%20REPORT%20final%20revs.pdf (accessed May 6, 2015).

  52. 52.

    Bueger, 161.

  53. 53.

    Germond, 139.

  54. 54.

    This approach is referred to as the “cabbage strategy” in China and the “salami-slicing strategy” in the United States. O’Rourke, 11.

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The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not represent official policy or the views of the US Navy, the Department of Defense, and the US Government.

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Gagliano, J.A. (2018). Blurred Lines: Twenty-First Century Maritime Security in the South China Sea. In: Gresh, G.F. (eds) Eurasia’s Maritime Rise and Global Security. Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71806-4_8

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