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International Sanctions as a Primary Institution of International Society

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International Organization in the Anarchical Society

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in International Relations ((PSIR))

Abstract

This chapter explores international sanctions as a practice for states to collectively punish the violation of important international norms through the institutionalized authority of international organizations. More than instrumental foreign policy tools, sanction are ways for states to reaffirm core constitutive principles of international society, stigmatize transgressors and deter future norm violations. The chapter discusses the development of international sanctions since the Concert of Europe and traces how sanctioning as an international practice has shaped the institutions of great power management and war. In so doing, it shows how ‘secondary’ institutions, primarily in this case the United Nations, through institutionalized practices such as international sanctions, can change the understanding or shape the transformation of certain primary institutions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The TSC is a part of the Graduate Institute of Geneva’s Programme for the Study of International Governance and a project directed by Professor Thomas Bierstker to house quantitative and qualitative data on UN targeted sanctions (http://graduateinstitute.ch/un-sanctions). For every instance of UN sanctions, the database codes the effectiveness of the regime as a tool to induce behavioural change, constrain resources necessary to continue violations and stigmatize unruly actors.

  2. 2.

    Although sanctions imposed by UNSC Resolution 661 were lifted by UNSC Resolution 686 (1991) following the Gulf War and the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, UNSC Resolution 687 continued to hold Iraq accountable for paying war damages and its continuing threat to support terrorism and develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This new comprehensive resolution included a long list of requirements for the lifting of sanctions, including the elimination of WMD, agreement not to develop WMD in the future, establishment of an inspections regime to monitor compliance and adherence to debt obligations and other financial claims (UNSC Resolution 687). Comprehensive international sanctions were finally lifted in 2003 and replaced with targeted sanctions.

  3. 3.

    The Oil-for-Food Programme allowed Iraq to export oil for humanitarian goods through a UN monitoring scheme. During its existence this programme processed $64 million of Iraqi oil (Chesterman et al. 2016, 380). However, not only was it burdensome, but it tasked the UN secretariat with ‘tasks that are beyond its competence’, thus leading to malpractice and corruption (Doxey 2009, 544).

  4. 4.

    In the late 1990s, reports conducted by the Swiss government, through the ‘Interlaken Process’ and Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies, formed the foundations for a rethinking of sanctions by the UN and the shift towards targeted measures.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. London School of Economics, London, UK

    Peter Wilson

  2. Durham University, Durham, UK

    Joanne Yao

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  1. Peter Wilson
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  2. Joanne Yao
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark

    Tonny Brems Knudsen

  2. University of Buckingham, Buckingham, UK

    Cornelia Navari

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Wilson, P., Yao, J. (2019). International Sanctions as a Primary Institution of International Society. In: Brems Knudsen, T., Navari, C. (eds) International Organization in the Anarchical Society. Palgrave Studies in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71622-0_6

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