An Industrial Outlook on Challenges of Hardware Security in Digital Economy—Extended Abstract—

  • Shivam BhasinEmail author
  • Victor Lomné
  • Karim Tobich
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10662)


Thanks to the seminal works of Kocher on side-channel attacks [1, 2] and Boneh et al. on fault injection attacks [3] in the 1990s, the domain of physical attacks has emerged as an active research domain as well as a potential threat on commercial devices. Practical hacks using physical attacks have been demonstrated on commercial products like NXP MiFare [4], KEELOQ [5], Sony PlayStation, etc. The threat becomes even bigger with the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT), digital economy and identity. Digital economy is a push towards cashless society, encouraging digital banking with use of modern payment methods based on smartcards and now smartphones. Digital identity now uses biometric data, like fingerprints, to authenticate people. Several governments are giving a push for digital economy and identity. This has led to rapid adoption of mobile payments, cashless solutions, biometric identities. Often biometrics are linked to payment solution.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Temasek LaboratoriesNanyang Technological UniversitySingaporeSingapore
  2. 2.NinjaLabMontpellierFrance
  3. 3.UL Transaction SecurityBasingstokeUK

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