Advertisement

Economically Optimal Variable Tag Length Message Authentication

  • Reihaneh Safavi-NainiEmail author
  • Viliam Lisý
  • Yvo Desmedt
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10322)

Abstract

Cryptographic authentication protects messages against forgeries. In real life, messages carry information of different value and the gain of the adversary in a successful forgery and the corresponding cost of the system designers, depend on the “meaning” of the message. This is easy o see by comparing the successful forgery of a $1,000 transaction with the forgery of a $1 one. Cryptographic protocols require computation and increase communication cost of the system, and an economically optimal system must optimize these costs such that message protection be commensurate to their values. This is especially important for resource limited devices that rely on battery power. A MAC (Message Authentication Code) provides protection by appending a cryptographic tag to the message. For secure MACs, the tag length is the main determinant of the security level: longer tags provide higher protection and at the same time increase the communication cost of the system. Our goal is to find the economically optimal tag lengths when messages carry information of different values.

We propose a novel approach to model the cost and benefit of information authentication as a two-party extensive-form game, show how to find a Nash equilibrium for the game, and determine the optimal tag lengths for messages. We prove that computing an optimal solution for the game is NP-complete, and then show how to find an optimal solution using single Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP). We apply the approach to the protection of messages in an industrial control system using realistic messages, and give our analysis with numerical results obtained using off-the-shelf IBM CPLEX solver.

Keywords

Message authentication Economics of authentication Authentication game Rational adversary in cryptography Game complexity 

Notes

Acknowledgement

First author’s work is in part supported by Natural Sciences Research Council of Canada, and Alberta Innovates Technology Futures of the province of Alberta. Third author’s work is supported by EPSRC EP/C538285/1 and by BT, as BT Chair of Information Security, and by the State of Texas.

References

  1. 1.
    Abraham, I., Dolev, D., Gonen, R., Halpern, J.: Distributed computing meets game theory: robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pp. 53–62. ACM (2006)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Anderson, R.: Economics and security resource page. http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/econsec.html. Accessed 19 Feb 2016
  3. 3.
    Asharov, G., Canetti, R., Hazay, C.: Towards a game theoretic view of secure computation. In: Paterson, K.G. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2011. LNCS, vol. 6632, pp. 426–445. Springer, Heidelberg (2011).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20465-4_24 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Aumann, Y., Lindell, Y.: Security against covert adversaries: efficient protocols for realistic adversaries. In: Vadhan, S.P. (ed.) TCC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4392, pp. 137–156. Springer, Heidelberg (2007).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70936-7_8 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Bellare, M., Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Keying hash functions for message authentication. In: Koblitz, N. (ed.) CRYPTO 1996. LNCS, vol. 1109, pp. 1–15. Springer, Heidelberg (1996).  https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68697-5_1 Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Bellare, M., Kilian, J., Rogaway, P.: The security of the cipher block chaining message authentication code. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 61(3), 362–399 (2000)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Bohme, R., Moore, T.: The iterated weakest link - a model of adaptive security investment. In: 8th Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS) (2009)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Conitzer, V., Sandholm, T.: Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. In: Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 82–90. ACM (2006)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Desmedt, Y.: Analysis of the Security and New Algorithms for Modern Industrial Cryptography. Ph.D. thesis, K.U. Leuven, Leuven, October 1984Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Desmedt, Y., Vandewalle, J., Govaerts, R.: The mathematical relation between the economic cryptographic and information theoretical aspects of authentication. In: Proceedings of the 4th Symposium on Information Theory in the Benelux, pp. 63–66. Werkgemeenschap voor Informatie- en Communicatietheorie (1983)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Fuchsbauer, G., Katz, J., Naccache, D.: Efficient rational secret sharing in standard communication networks. In: Micciancio, D. (ed.) TCC 2010. LNCS, vol. 5978, pp. 419–436. Springer, Heidelberg (2010).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_25 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Fultz, N., Grossklags, J.: Blue versus red: towards a model of distributed security attacks. In: Dingledine, R., Golle, P. (eds.) FC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5628, pp. 167–183. Springer, Heidelberg (2009).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03549-4_10 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Garay, J., Katz, J., Maurer, U., Tackmann, B., Zikas, V.: Rational protocol design: cryptography against incentive-driven adversaries. In: 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 648–657. IEEE (2013)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Gilbert, E.N., MacWilliams, F.J., Sloane, N.J.: Codes which detect deception. Bell Syst. Tech. J. 53(3), 405–424 (1974)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    Groce, A., Katz, J.: Fair computation with rational players. In: Pointcheval, D., Johansson, T. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2012. LNCS, vol. 7237, pp. 81–98. Springer, Heidelberg (2012).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_7 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 16.
    Halpern, J., Teague, V.: Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 623–632. ACM (2004)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Karp, R.M.: Reducibility among combinatorial problems. In: Miller, R.E., Thatcher, J.W., Bohlinger, J.D. (eds.) Complexity of Computer Computations. IRSS, pp. 85–103. Springer, Boston (1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. 18.
    Katz, J., Lindell, Y.: Introduction to Modern Cryptography: Principles and Protocols. CRC Press, Boca Raton (2007)zbMATHGoogle Scholar
  19. 19.
    Kiekintveld, C., Islam, T., Kreinovich, V.: Security games with interval uncertainty. In: Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, pp. 231–238. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (2013)Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Kiekintveld, C., Marecki, J., Tambe, M.: Approximation methods for infinite bayesian stackelberg games: modeling distributional payoff uncertainty. In: The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems-Volume 3, pp. 1005–1012. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (2011)Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Kol, G., Naor, M.: Cryptography and game theory: designing protocols for exchanging information. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 320–339. Springer, Heidelberg (2008).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8_18 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Mukherjee, A.: Physical-layer security in the internet of things: sensing and communication confidentiality under resource constraints. Proc. IEEE 103(10), 1747–1761 (2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. 23.
    Osborne, M.J., Rubinstein, A.: A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge (1994)zbMATHGoogle Scholar
  24. 24.
    Paruchuri, P., Pearce, J.P., Marecki, J., Tambe, M., Ordonez, F., Kraus, S.: Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian stackelberg games. In: Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems-Volume 2, pp. 895–902. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (2008)Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    Pass, R., Halpern, J.: Game theory with costly computation: formulation and application to protocol security. In: Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions, p. 89. ACM (2010)Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    Rose, K., Eldridge, S., Chapin, L.: The internet of things (IoT): An overview-understanding the issues and challenges of a more connected world. Internet Society (2015)Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    Simmons, G.J.: Authentication theory/coding theory. In: Blakley, G.R., Chaum, D. (eds.) CRYPTO 1984. LNCS, vol. 196, pp. 411–431. Springer, Heidelberg (1985).  https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39568-7_32 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. 28.
    Tambe, M.: Security and Game Theory: Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2011)CrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  29. 29.
    Van Dijk, M., Juels, A., Oprea, A., Rivest, R.L.: FLIPIT: the game of stealthy takeover. J. Cryptol. 26(4), 655–713 (2013)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  30. 30.
    Varian, H.: System reliability and free riding. In: Camp, L.J., Lewis, S. (eds.) Economics of Information Security. ADIS, vol. 12, pp. 1–15. Springer, Boston (2004).  https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-8090-5_1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. 31.
    Verbauwhede, I.: VLSI design methods for low power embedded encryption. In: Proceedings of the 26th Edition on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, p. 7. ACM (2016)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© International Financial Cryptography Association 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Reihaneh Safavi-Naini
    • 1
    Email author
  • Viliam Lisý
    • 2
    • 3
  • Yvo Desmedt
    • 4
    • 5
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of CalgaryCalgaryCanada
  2. 2.Department of Computing ScienceUniversity of AlbertaEdmontonCanada
  3. 3.Department of Computing Science, FEECzech Technical University in PraguePragueCzech Republic
  4. 4.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity College LondonLondonUK
  5. 5.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Texas at DallasRichardsonUSA

Personalised recommendations