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Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage

  • Guy Barwell
  • Daniel P. MartinEmail author
  • Elisabeth Oswald
  • Martijn Stam
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10624)

Abstract

Authenticated encryption schemes in practice have to be robust against adversaries that have access to various types of leakage, for instance decryption leakage on invalid ciphertexts (protocol leakage), or leakage on the underlying primitives (side channel leakage). This work includes several novel contributions: we augment the notion of nonce-base authenticated encryption with the notion of continuous leakage and we prove composition results in the face of protocol and side channel leakage. Moreover, we show how to achieve authenticated encryption that is simultaneously both misuse resistant and leakage resilient, based on a sufficiently leakage resilient PRF, and finally we propose a concrete, pairing-based instantiation of the latter.

Keywords

Provable security Authenticated encryption Generic composition Leakage resilience Robustness 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Initial work was conducted while Dan Martin was employed by the Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol. Guy Barwell was supported by an EPSRC grant; Elisabeth Oswald and Dan Martin were in part supported by EPSRC via grants EP/I005226/1 (SILENT) and EP/N011635/1 (LADA).

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guy Barwell
    • 1
  • Daniel P. Martin
    • 2
    • 3
    Email author
  • Elisabeth Oswald
    • 1
  • Martijn Stam
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of BristolBristolUK
  2. 2.School of MathematicsUniversity of BristolBristolUK
  3. 3.The Heilbronn Institute for Mathematical ResearchBristolUK

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