Creating Creatures of Fiction: A Fictional Dialogue

Chapter
Part of the Münster Lectures in Philosophy book series (MUELP, volume 4)

Abstract

By holding a very vague ontology of fictional entities, Peter van Inwagen tries to avoid many difficulties which more precise theories on this topic face. Moreover, he claims that his theory also easily solves several problems without creating new ones. In order to prove whether this is really so, we confront (a fictional?) Peter van Inwagen in a dialogue with implications and follow-up questions of his theses concerning creatures of fiction. However, we do not hold one central thesis against him, but rather try to help him overcome his vagueness and be more precise by answering our questions which relate – among other things – to the genesis of fictional creatures as well as particular border cases.

Keywords

Assertion Creationism Fiction Platonism Theoretical entities 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyWWU MünsterMünsterGermany
  2. 2.Faculty for Catholic TheologyRuhr UniversityBochumGermany

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