## Abstract

Van Inwagen proposes that besides simples only living organisms exist as composite objects. This paper suggests expanding van Inwagen’s ontology by also accepting composite objects in the case that physical bonding occurs (plus some extra conditions). Such objects are not living organisms but rather physical bodies. They include (approximately) the complete realm of inanimate ordinary objects, like rocks and tables, as well as inanimate scientific objects, like atoms and molecules, the latter filling the ontological gap between simples and organisms in van Inwagen’s original picture. We thus propose a compositional pluralism claiming that composition arises if and only if bonding *or* life occurs.

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## Notes

- 1.
Two recent examples discussing the SCQ are Thomasson (2007, esp. 126–136) and Carmichael (2015), who both defend a commonsense view, the latter by giving a series-style answer. The question has been productive even outside of metaphysics. Chant (2006, 422), for instance, applies the SCQ in action theory by asking under what conditions several actions compose an extensive action. This is what she calls “The Special Composition Question in Action”.

- 2.
Van Inwagen (1990, 23–27) introduces “the

*x*s” as a plural name (“plural referring expression”) to be able to refer to certain objects as a plurality without talking about contested entities like the set of these objects. - 3.
But see Tallant (2014) for a critique of this strategy.

- 4.
Cf. Lewis’ definition of intrinsic properties: “If something has an intrinsic property, then so does any perfect duplicate of that thing; whereas duplicates situated in different surroundings will differ in their extrinsic properties.” (Lewis 1983, 197) Van Inwagen reformulates this principle in the style of his SCQ to make it suitable for discussing composite objects.

- 5.
Note that our proposal does not depend on the fact that these currently accepted fundamental objects are indeed indivisible; it only depends on the fact that objects from possible deeper levels compose in a similar way to these “fundamental” particles, as these compose to higher objects. Presupposing that there is a fundamental level at which certain simples exist, we should say that we do not discuss the case that the world might be “gunky”, i.e., infinitely divisible.

- 6.
- 7.
The idea of series-style proposals is to say that there are several types of relations

*R*_{1}, …,*R*_{n}(e.g., several types of bonding) as well as several types of objects*F*_{1}, …,*F*_{n}that have to be discerned for answering the SCQ; for the*x*s of a certain kind*F*_{i}only compose something if they stand in the right kind of relation*R*_{i}. More precisely:∃

*y*(the*x*s compose*y*) if and only if the*x*s are*F*_{1}and stand in*R*_{1}, or the*x*s are*F*_{2}and stand in*R*_{2}, …, or the*x*s are*F*_{n}and stand in*R*_{n}.Van Inwagen (1990, 64–66) presents convincing arguments against this kind of proposal.

- 8.
Unlike in other works on mereology, here fusion does not denote the mereological sum, but rather the very specific kind of bonding by merging.

- 9.
Van Inwagen’s claim that he has no argument against contact might seem odd given that above we have presented his arguments from elementary particles lacking shape and definite location. The explanation seems to be that his argument from elementary particles presupposes quantum physics and after having presented that argument he asks to “imagine ourselves in a comfortable seventeenth-century physical world, a world that consists entirely of physical objects of various sizes – solid objects having surfaces and made of stuffs” (van Inwagen 1990, 34). It is only in this restricted classical image that van Inwagen is left with his example of two people shaking hands and cannot deliver an argument against contact. The situation, however, is not similar in the cases of bonding: there he only presents the modified examples of shaking hands – so in those cases there really seems to be no argument at all.

- 10.
Locke calls such composite objects “mass” or “body” (1690,

*Essay*II 27 §3). - 11.
The definition of a physical body through bonding applies without modification to the quantum case. However, the consequence implied by that definition and the finite distance condition that a physical body’s extension is limited rests on the classical assumption of definite locations for the involved objects – which is false in a standard interpretation of the quantum realm. There, objects do not have definite locations but only probabilities for being measured at certain locations; so in our reasoning one would have to replace spatial distance with

*probabilities*of spatial distance. - 12.
The same is not true of the other fundamental interactions: Nuclear interactions (both weak and strong) are effective only at an atomic length scale (they do not act over large distances); and while gravitational influences – like electromagnetic ones – act over large distances, they are – in contrast to electromagnetic ones – always attractive (as, e.g., between the earth and the moon).

- 13.
Precisely, H5 reads: Let the variable

*y*range over all objects,*x*_{1}and*x*_{2}over the*x*s, and*z*over all objects except the*x*s. Then: ∃*y*(the*x*s compose*y*) if (a) ∀*x*_{1}∀*x*_{2}(*x*_{1}≠*x*_{2}→*x*_{1}and*x*_{2}bind directly or indirectly)*and*(b2) ¬∃*z*∃*x*_{1}(*z*and*x*_{1}bind directly). - 14.
Note that the handle satisfies both the finite distance and the joint movability condition for physical objects. Thus, it becomes apparent that these conditions are only necessary and not sufficient for physical composition.

- 15.
But cf. Schaffer (2010) who defends an even more radical monism on the basis of quantum entanglement (which we have said to neglect here): He defends the thesis that there literally is only one object, the whole universe. So unlike the monism threatening from H5, Schaffer’s monism even denies the existence of simples.

- 16.
If the point of zero energy is chosen at the maximum of the lowest potential barrier, the binding energy equals the negative total energy of a system.

- 17.
The joule is the basic unit for measuring energy and “kJ” means “1000 joules”; specifying the binding energy per mole means to give the binding energy for 6.022 × 10

^{−23}bonds of the same type, i.e. 1 kJ/mol = 6.022 x 10^{−20}J. - 18.
Here is H6 in a precise form: Let the variable

*y*range over all objects,*x*_{1}and*x*_{2}over the*x*s,*z*over all objects except the*x*s, and*e*over possible energy values. Let us furthermore assume that if two objects bind directly, they are not identical. Then: ∃*y*(the*x*s compose*y*) if (a) ∀*x*_{1}∀*x*_{2}(*x*_{1}≠*x*_{2}→*x*_{1}and*x*_{2}bind directly or indirectly)*and*(b) ∃*e*[(b1) ∀*x*_{1}∀*x*_{2}(*x*_{1}and*x*_{2}bind directly → binding energy(*x*_{1},*x*_{2}) ≥ e)*and*(b2’) ¬ ∃*z*∃*x*_{1}(*z*and*x*_{1}bind directly & binding energy(*z*,*x*_{1})≥*e*)]. - 19.
- 20.
Precisely: Let the variables

*x*_{1}and*x*_{2}range over the*x*s,*e*and*e’*over possible energy values. An object*a*, which is composed by the*x*s, has robustness*e*if and only if ∃*e*[(b1) ∀*x*_{1}∀*x*_{2}(*x*_{1}and x_{2}bind directly → binding energy(*x*_{1},*x*_{2}) ≥*e*)*and*(b3) ∀*e’*(*e’*>*e*→ ∃*x*_{1}∃*x*_{2}(*x*_{1}and*x*_{2}bind directly & binding energy(*x*_{1},*x*_{2}) <*e’*))]. - 21.
Formally: Let the variable

*y r*ange over all objects,*x*_{1}and*x*_{2}over the*x*s,*z*over all objects except the*x*s,*e*and*e’*over possible energy values. Let us furthermore assume that if two objects bind directly, they are not identical. Then: ∃*y*(the*x*s compose*y*) if (a) ∀*x*_{1}∀*x*_{2}(*x*_{1}≠*x*_{2}→*x*_{1}and*x*_{2}bind directly or indirectly)*and*(b) ∃*e*[(b1) ∀*x*_{1}∀*x*_{2}(*x*_{1}and*x*_{2}bind directly → binding energy(*x*_{1},*x*_{2}) ≥*e*)*and*(b2’) ¬ ∃*z*∃*x*_{1}(*z*and*x*_{1}bind directly & binding energy(*z*,*x*_{1}) ≥*e*)*and*(b3) ∀*e’*(*e’*>*e*→ ∃*x*_{1}∃*x*_{2}(*x*_{1}and*x*_{2}bind directly & binding energy(*x*_{1}, x_{2}) <*e’*))].

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Husmann, J., Näger, P.M. (2018). Physical Composition by Bonding. In: Jansen, L., Näger, P. (eds) Peter van Inwagen. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70052-6_4

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