Replies

Chapter
Part of the Münster Lectures in Philosophy book series (MUELP, volume 4)

Abstract

This chapter provides Peter van Inwagen’s replies to each of the contributions in this volume.

Keywords

Rational peer disagreement Ontological commitment Meta-ontology Composition Mereology Fictional entities Artifacts Free will Fatalism Accountability Problem of evil Extended free will defense 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Notre DameNotre DameUSA

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