The Problem of Free Will Revisited

Chapter
Part of the Münster Lectures in Philosophy book series (MUELP, volume 4)

Abstract

This paper concerns the effect that confused thinking has had on the language in which the free-will problem has been framed and discussed in recent philosophy. The thesis of the paper is that this language, this family of interwoven technical terms, has, as a consequence of this confused thinking, been corrupted – has in fact become hopelessly corrupt.

Keywords

Free will determinism moral responsibility technical terms 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Notre DameNotre DameUSA

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