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Revenue Improvement Mechanisms Based on Advertisement’s Values and Layouts

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Recent Advances and Future Prospects in Knowledge, Information and Creativity Support Systems (KICSS 2015)

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 685))

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Abstract

We study an advertisement transaction market which is considering a value of advertisement in addition to monetary value. This paper proposes a novel model for advertisement transactions which employs two stages auctions. To improve an advertisement value for advertisers, it is important to consider not only advertisement sizes and its allocations but also its combinations for the advertisers’ marketing strategies. The two stages auction aims to improve the advertisement value and seller’s revenue. The concept of our model is that the advertisers can consider own marketing strategies for the auction. The first auction winner can choose some preferred other advertisers to make a second auction, and also he/she can reject inconvenient advertisers. The first auction winner can consider the marketing strategy by making a convenient bidders set in the second auction.

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Acknowledgements

This research is supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (KAKENHI 26870200, 15H02972).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The University of Electro-Communications, Chofu, Japan

    Satoshi Takahashi

  2. Advanced Institute of Industrial Technology, Tokyo, Japan

    Tokuro Matsuo

Authors
  1. Satoshi Takahashi
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  2. Tokuro Matsuo
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Satoshi Takahashi .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Information, Computer, and Communication Technology (ICT), Sirindhorn International Institute of Technology, Thammasat University, Pathum Thani, Thailand

    Thanaruk Theeramunkong

  2. Department of Automatic Control and Biomedical Engineering, AGH University of Science and Technology, Kraków, Poland

    Andrzej M.J. Skulimowski

  3. Graduate School of Advanced Science and Technology, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Nomi-shi, Ishikawa, Japan

    Takaya Yuizono

  4. School of Knowledge Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Nomi-shi, Ishikawa, Japan

    Susumu Kunifuji

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Takahashi, S., Matsuo, T. (2018). Revenue Improvement Mechanisms Based on Advertisement’s Values and Layouts. In: Theeramunkong, T., Skulimowski, A., Yuizono, T., Kunifuji, S. (eds) Recent Advances and Future Prospects in Knowledge, Information and Creativity Support Systems. KICSS 2015. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 685. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70019-9_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70019-9_22

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-70018-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-70019-9

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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