Abstract
The value introduced by Shapley is still one of the most popular solution concepts for cooperative games. As a well-defined, always nonempty solution, it is an attractive solution that is supported by a fine axiomatisation and is a model that has also been implemented. When externalities are introduced into the game, both its axiomatisation — namely, the Null Player Property — and its construction looking at marginal contributions need to be modified. In this Chapter we use the already modified axioms to establish values that resemble the Shapley-value in some sense as well as present some results where natural extensions of the Shapley-value are modified. We discuss the potential approach for partition function form games and present result for the implementation and the calculation of extended Shapleyvalues.
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© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
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Kóczy, L.Á. (2018). The Shapley-value. In: Partition Function Form Games. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 48. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69841-0_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69841-0_9
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Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-69840-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-69841-0
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