• László Á. Kóczy
Part of the Theory and Decision Library C book series (TDLC, volume 48)


Value concepts constitute a different, normative approach to solve cooperative games. This approach has been introduced by Shapley who introduced the value as the unique allocation function that satisfies a set of desirable properties, axioms. Since then several values have been defined: which value is right for us? Our choice can only be based on the axioms that define the values—even more so than for stability based concepts. There is already a great variety of axioms for characteristic function form games; in this chapter we introduce their different extensions to partition function form games.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Economics, Centre for Economics and Regional StudiesHungarian Academy of SciencesBudapestHungary

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