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Cooperation in Multicriteria Repeated Games

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EVOLVE - A Bridge between Probability, Set Oriented Numerics, and Evolutionary Computation VI

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 674))

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Abstract

In classical Game Theory a rational player’s goal is to maximize its payoff by choosing a strategy that is best response to the opponent’s strategy. This theoretical presumption leads to mutual defection in dilemma games. Despite theoretical prediction in real life situations players tend to cooperate. Our goal is to develop a model that overcomes some of the limitations of classical models. We investigate the emergence of cooperation for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in a spatial framework with multicriteria payoffs. We propose a multicriteria model where a second criterion, that reflects the identity of a player, is introduced. Numerical experiments show that the second criterion promotes cooperation without any external interactions. The proposed model allows the interaction of different type of players which leads to more realistic outcomes.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

    Réka Nagy, Mihai Suciu & Dan Dumitrescu

Authors
  1. Réka Nagy
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  2. Mihai Suciu
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  3. Dan Dumitrescu
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Réka Nagy .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science and Communications Research Unit, University of Luxembourg E009 (CSC) Kirchberg Campus, Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Alexandru-Adrian Tantar

  2. Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Emilia Tantar

  3. Leiden Institute of Advanced Computer Science, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands

    Michael Emmerich

  4. Bâtiment Leyteire, URF Sciences et Modelisation, Université Bordeaux, Bordeaux, France

    Pierrick Legrand

  5. Faculty of Computer Science, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, Iași, Romania

    Lenuta Alboaie

  6. Faculty of Computer Science, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Iasi, Romania

    Henri Luchian

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Nagy, R., Suciu, M., Dumitrescu, D. (2018). Cooperation in Multicriteria Repeated Games. In: Tantar, AA., Tantar, E., Emmerich, M., Legrand, P., Alboaie, L., Luchian, H. (eds) EVOLVE - A Bridge between Probability, Set Oriented Numerics, and Evolutionary Computation VI. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 674. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69710-9_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69710-9_8

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-69708-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-69710-9

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