Nigeria’s Engagement

  • Marco Boggero


This chapter gives an account of Nigeria’s first engagement with regulatory cooperation, and the normative drivers that drove a rapprochement to Montreux. The policy choice of contracting is associated to the fight against Boko Haram and to contingencies, including political transition. I delineate how state responsibility may arise for a territorial and contracting state—direct attribution of wrongful conduct to the hiring state—or a state failure to prevent, investigate, punish, or redress PMSC conduct. Thus, the engagement with Montreux Document would be significant step in clarifying the responsibilities with possible regional implications for other states and for regional and continental political organizations.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marco Boggero
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Advanced International StudiesJohns Hopkins UniversityWashington, DCUSA

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