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The United Nations as Actor of Governance

  • Marco Boggero
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter describes how the preferences of the United Nations evolved quite independently of the Swiss initiative and how they were shaped by the highly institutionalized anti-mercenary norm. An international treaty aimed at setting the highest standards for PMSCs but failed to gain support. Key events created continuity and change, such as the Iraq war, the UN Baghdad bombing, and the reform of the Human Rights bodies. Narratives and tables illustrate how the United Nations gradually shifted to accept the distinction between “mercenaries” and PMSCs.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marco Boggero
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Advanced International StudiesJohns Hopkins UniversityWashington, DCUSA

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