Introduction

  • Marco Boggero
Chapter

Abstract

The chapter spells out questions and definitions starting from the proposition that regulatory cooperation consists in facilitating the acceptance and use of a single identifier for private military and security companies. The three bodies of literature used in the book are articulated as well as the methodology, case selection, and the rationalist approach that articulates how interests, ideas, and institutions drive preferences and choices at the state and interstate level. The chapter also specifies the expectations for norms—specifically neutral humanitarianism norm and the anti-mercenary norm—the strongest driver or inhibitor of regulatory cooperation.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marco Boggero
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Advanced International StudiesJohns Hopkins UniversityWashington, DCUSA

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