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Britain in the Arctic Today

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Abstract

For nearly two decades after the end of the Cold War, successive British governments appeared largely ambivalent about Britain’s interests in the Arctic. That changed in the mid-2000s, as concerns about climate change, energy security, and Russia, brought the Arctic in from the cold. Since then, British interest has grown in at least three areas: science, defence, and commerce. This chapter explores where these interests come from, what actors are involved, and how they are forging new connections between Britain and the Arctic.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The phrase ‘post-West’ world order was used by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2017.

  2. 2.

    Author interview with two Ministry of Defence Officials, 1 May 2012.

  3. 3.

    In contrast, another major European power such as Germany, lacking Britain’s combination of geography and capability to project force, would be unlikely to exert the same effect.

  4. 4.

    In 2011, for example, a Defence Correspondent at The Telegraph was quick to criticise the Government for being ‘woefully unprepared for Arctic warfare’ after a joint Foreign Office/Ministry of Defence paper on security challenges facing Britain in the Arctic was leaked (Harding 2011).

  5. 5.

    Machowski compares that with Antarctica, ‘where a well-defined and implemented international scientific cooperation has been developed early and successfully’ following the IGY 1957–1958 (Machowski 1993: 181).

  6. 6.

    That such talks should have occurred at SCAR may sound surprising but during the IGY, the International Council for Science (ICSU) initially discussed a proposal to establish a Scientific Committee on Arctic and Antarctic Research. However, participants in those discussions concluded that given numerous political and strategic obstacles in the Arctic, it was only feasible to establish a body for Antarctica—SCAR (Machowski 1993).

  7. 7.

    Over the next decade, NERC expenditure on the Arctic remained between £1 and £2 million per year, while expenditure on Antarctica was over £20 million (peaking in 1990 at £48 million).

  8. 8.

    Although it also worth noting that representatives from SPRI were closely involved in the writing of the NERC strategy and therefore may well have been protecting their own interests here too.

  9. 9.

    A second British scientist, Terry Callaghan, was also invited to serve as a lead author but was directly funded by Sweden.

  10. 10.

    Author interview with Foreign Office official, 5 October 2011.

  11. 11.

    Although to help put that figure in perspective it is worth noting that the British Antarctic Survey’s annual operating budget is around £50 million, most of which is funded by the Government and directed towards Antarctica (although that figure includes the maintenance of logistics and facilities, and training, in addition to research, a small proportion of which happens in the Arctic).

  12. 12.

    Other political and cultural definitions also exist, wherein, for example, the Arctic is defined by the presence of indigenous peoples.

  13. 13.

    The implications of Britain leaving the EU for British participation in such programmes remain uncertain.

  14. 14.

    Guggenheim has broken the $1 trillion figure down roughly as follows: Energy ($193 billion), Mining ($80 billion), Renewable Energy ($61 billion), Rail ($23 billion), Industry ($19 billion), Maritime ($17 billion), Road ($13 billion), Power ($13 billion), Tourism ($5 billion), Aviation ($3.3 billion), Social ($2.4 billion), Telecom ($1.8 billion), and Trade ($1.7 billion).

  15. 15.

    The Northeast and Northwest Passages reportedly offer distance savings of between 17% and 30% for shipping between East Asia, Northern Europe, and northerly parts of North America when compared with traditional routes using the Suez and Panama canals.

  16. 16.

    The widely publicised US Geological Survey report of 2008 claimed that total estimated hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic amount to around 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13% of undiscovered oil. Critically, these estimates relate to resources which are technically recoverable. It does not make any assessment of whether they are commercially recoverable.

  17. 17.

    In 2010, £1 of every £7 paid in dividend to UK pension funds by FTSE 100 companies came from BP. In 2009, UK taxes linked to BP totalled £5.8 billion (Reuben 2010).

  18. 18.

    Britain’s crude oil imports from Norway peaked at around 67% in 2011 (they still make up roughly 50%). Gas imports from Norway doubled between 2006 and 2008, rising to 55% in 2012 and 61% in 2015.

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Depledge, D. (2018). Britain in the Arctic Today. In: Britain and the Arctic. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69293-7_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69293-7_4

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-69292-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-69293-7

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