A Stochastic Game-Theoretic Model for Smart Grid Communication Networks

  • Xiaobing HeEmail author
  • Hermann de Meer
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10575)


The increasing adoption of new information and communication technology assets in smart grids is making smart grids vulnerable to cyber threats, as well as raising numerous concerns about the adequacy of current security approaches. As a single act of penetration is often not sufficient for an attacker to achieve his/her goal, multistage cyber attacks may occur. This paper looks at the stochastic and dynamic nature of multistage cyber attacks in smart grid use cases and develops a stochastic game-theoretic model to capture the interactions between the attacker and the defender in multistage cyber attack scenarios. Due to the information asymmetry of the interactions between the attacker and the defender, neither of both players knows the exact current game state. This paper proposes a belief-updating mechanism for both players to form a common belief about the current game state. In order to assess threats of multistage cyber attacks, it further discusses the computation of Nash equilibria for the designed game model.


Asymmetric information Positive stop probability Stochastic game Multistage cyber attacks Smart grid Threat assessment 



The research leading to the results presented in this paper was supported by the European Commission’s Project No. 608090, HyRiM (Hybrid Risk Management for Utility Networks) under the 7th Framework Programme (FP7-SEC-2013-1). The authors acknowledge Stefan Rass from Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt for his invaluable discussions and comments.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Informatics and MathematicsUniversity of PassauPassauGermany

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