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Towards a Mechanized Proof of Selene Receipt-Freeness and Vote-Privacy

  • Alessandro Bruni
  • Eva Drewsen
  • Carsten Schürmann
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10615)

Abstract

Selene is a novel voting protocol that supports individual verifiability, Vote-Privacy and Receipt-Freeness. The scheme provides tracker numbers that allow voters to retrieve their votes from a public bulletin board and a commitment scheme that allows them to hide their vote from a potential coercer. So far, however, Selene was never studied formally. The Selene protocol was neither completely formalized, nor were the correctness proofs for Vote-Privacy and Receipt-Freeness.

In this paper, we give a formal model for a simplified version of Selene in the symbolic model, along with a machine-checked proof of Vote-Privacy and Receipt-Freeness. All proofs are checked with the Tamarin theorem prover.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alessandro Bruni
    • 1
  • Eva Drewsen
    • 1
  • Carsten Schürmann
    • 1
  1. 1.IT University of CopenhagenCopenhagenDenmark

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