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Hardware Trojans in Analog, Mixed-Signal, and RF ICs

  • Angelos AntonopoulosEmail author
  • Christiana Kapatsori
  • Yiorgos Makris
Chapter

Abstract

In this chapter we summarize and present the existing, albeit limited work on known vulnerabilities and proposed remedies for AMS/RF ICs, emphasizing on hardware Trojans.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Angelos Antonopoulos
    • 1
    Email author
  • Christiana Kapatsori
    • 1
  • Yiorgos Makris
    • 1
  1. 1.ECE DepartmentUniversity of Texas at DallasRichardsonUSA

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