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Hardware Trojans in Analog, Mixed-Signal, and RF ICs

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The Hardware Trojan War

Abstract

In this chapter we summarize and present the existing, albeit limited work on known vulnerabilities and proposed remedies for AMS/RF ICs, emphasizing on hardware Trojans.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. ECE Department, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, 75080, USA

    Angelos Antonopoulos, Christiana Kapatsori & Yiorgos Makris

Authors
  1. Angelos Antonopoulos
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  2. Christiana Kapatsori
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  3. Yiorgos Makris
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Angelos Antonopoulos .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA

    Swarup Bhunia

  2. Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA

    Mark M. Tehranipoor

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Antonopoulos, A., Kapatsori, C., Makris, Y. (2018). Hardware Trojans in Analog, Mixed-Signal, and RF ICs. In: Bhunia, S., Tehranipoor, M. (eds) The Hardware Trojan War. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68511-3_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68511-3_5

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-68510-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-68511-3

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