Routing Game on the Line: The Case of Multi-players

  • Abdelillah Karouit
  • Majed Haddad
  • Eitan Altman
  • Moulay Abdellatif Lmater
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10542)

Abstract

In this paper, we tackle the problem of a sequential routing game where multiple users coexist and competitively send their traffic to a destination over a line. The users arrive at time epoch with a given capacity. Then, they ship their demands over time on a shared resource. The state of players evolve according to whether they decide to transmit or not. The decision of each user is thus spatio-temporal control. We provide an explicit expression of the equilibrium of such systems and compare it to the global optimum case. In particular, we determine the expression of price of anarchy of such scheme and identify a Braess-type paradox in the context of sequential routing game.

Keywords

Sequential routing game Nash equilibrium Price of anarchy Braess-type paradox 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Abdelillah Karouit
    • 1
  • Majed Haddad
    • 1
  • Eitan Altman
    • 2
  • Moulay Abdellatif Lmater
    • 3
  1. 1.LIA/CERI, University of Avignon, AgroparcAvignonFrance
  2. 2.INRIA Sophia AntipolisSophia AntipolisFrance
  3. 3.L-IR2M, Faculty of Sciences and TechniquesHassan 1st UniversitySettatMorocco

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