Abstract
My aim in this chapter is to develop and defend attenuated methodological naturalism, which holds that we should allow metaphysical theories to be defeasible in light of scientific claims, but we should not immediately assess those metaphysical theories as being false given defeater instances—instead, we should suspend judgment to the theory. The upshot being that even though neo-Aristotelianism is a problematic theory, we should not reject it as being false, but should instead allow for the possibility of exploring other metaphysical theories.
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Winters, A.M. (2017). Attenuated Methodological Naturalism. In: Natural Processes. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67570-1_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67570-1_5
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