Impossible Colours: Wittgenstein and the Naturalist’s Challenge

Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 388)

Abstract

With the rise of naturalistic philosophy, conceptual analysis has faded into the background, and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s account of reddish green and transparent white as grammatically excluded has been written off or ignored. While his view of such impossible colours is, as he himself saw, open to question, so too is the naturalist’s alternative.

Notes

Acknowledgement

As usual I am grateful to my friend Paul Forster for very useful comments and encouragement.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of OttawaOttawaCanada

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