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Conference on Internet of Things and Smart Spaces

International Workshop on Nano-scale Computing and Communications

International Conference on Next Generation Wired/Wireless Networking

ruSMART 2017, NsCC 2017, NEW2AN 2017: Internet of Things, Smart Spaces, and Next Generation Networks and Systems pp 351–364Cite as

A Game-Theoretic Model for Investments in the Telecommunications Industry

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCCN,volume 10531))

Abstract

The rent-seeking behavior of domestic and foreign investors of the telecommunications sector was considered and analyzed. A game-theoretic model determining the behavior of investors was developed. Comparative results for three or more investors were obtained. The model of rent-seeking behavior, when each player is not indifferent about who will get the prize if he does not receive it himself, was proposed. The model is analyzed in cases of identical and different estimates of the rent by the players. The formulas for total equilibrium costs of the rent-seeking behavior as well as the individual equilibrium costs for each of the domestic and foreign firms under identical and different estimates of the rent were obtained. A situation with two Russian and one foreign investor of the telecom sector of the Russian Federation was deeply examined.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, St. Petersburg, Russia

    Sergey A. Chernogorskiy & K. V. Shvetsov

Authors
  1. Sergey A. Chernogorskiy
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  2. K. V. Shvetsov
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Sergey A. Chernogorskiy .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Electronics and Communication Engineering, Tampere University of Technology, Tampere, Finland

    Olga Galinina

  2. Electronics and Communication Engineering, Tampere University of Technology, Tampere, Finland

    Sergey Andreev

  3. FRUCT Oy, Helsinki, Finland

    Sergey Balandin

  4. Tampere University of Technology, Tampere, Finland

    Yevgeni Koucheryavy

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Chernogorskiy, S.A., Shvetsov, K.V. (2017). A Game-Theoretic Model for Investments in the Telecommunications Industry. In: Galinina, O., Andreev, S., Balandin, S., Koucheryavy, Y. (eds) Internet of Things, Smart Spaces, and Next Generation Networks and Systems. ruSMART NsCC NEW2AN 2017 2017 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10531. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67380-6_32

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67380-6_32

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-67379-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-67380-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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