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CPU and Keyboard: Weapons of Mass Disruption?

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Abstract

In a well-known paper on legal issues of computers and war Schmitt and others reminded their readers of the very basic fact that the “warriors” in computer wars would simply be “individuals armed with CPUs and keyboards”. However, a few years later during a press conference in May 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama referred to instruments of cyber warfare as “weapons of mass disruption”, obviously paraphrasing the well-known term of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and having in mind the catastrophic consequences a coordinated attack on critical infrastructure could trigger. This paper primarily seeks to give an overview of the legal issues raised and investigate whether and to which extent cyber warfare operations fall in line with a trend of dehumanisation of warfare in the sense of reducing the human role or component in warfare. Given the limited size many basic legal questions of cyber warfare will be touched upon but not discussed in detail.

S. Stadlmeier, Director, Institute of Public International Law, Air Law and International Relations, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Schmitt et al. (2004), p. 11.

  2. 2.

    http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30/us/politics/30cyber.html Accessed 13 Dec 2016.

  3. 3.

    http://www.oracle.com/index.html Accessed 13 Dec 2016.

  4. 4.

    Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol.

  5. 5.

    Industrial Control Software/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.

  6. 6.

    In this paper the term kinetic (meaning the projection or application of kinetic energy) is used to distinguish traditional forms of warfare from cyber warfare.

  7. 7.

    http://www.security-insider.de/themenbereiche/bedrohungen/menschliche-faktoren/articles/101229/ (Accessed 13 Dec 2016; source in German).

  8. 8.

    http://www.businessinsider.com/stuxnet-was-far-more-dangerous-than-previous-thought-2013-11?IR=T Accessed 13 Dec 2016.

  9. 9.

    Watts (2010), p. 397.

  10. 10.

    Hathaway et al. (2012), p. 838.

  11. 11.

    http://www.businessinsider.com/stuxnet-was-far-more-dangerous-than-previous-thought-2013-11?IR=T Accessed 13 Dec 2016.

  12. 12.

    Art 49 para 1 Additional Protocol 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

  13. 13.

    Art 2 para 4 UN Charter.

  14. 14.

    Art 39 UN Charter.

  15. 15.

    Art 51 UN Charter.

  16. 16.

    ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, ICJ Rep. 1986, pp. 14–150, 118.

  17. 17.

    See the overview in Ziolkowski (2012), p. 298.

  18. 18.

    Schmitt (2011), p. 576; Schmitt (2013), Tallinn Manual, Rule 11. – For a critical review see Ziolkowski (2012), p. 301 et seq.

  19. 19.

    See again Ziolkowski (2012), p. 298.

  20. 20.

    Art 5 North Atlantic Treaty; see http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm Accessed 13 Dec 2016.

  21. 21.

    Hathaway et al. (2012), p. 821.

  22. 22.

    Art 2 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility.

  23. 23.

    The most recent version IPv6 does identify each single machine but has not yet become universal standard.

  24. 24.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-day_(computing) Accessed 13 Dec 2016.

  25. 25.

    See Arts 49–53 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility.

  26. 26.

    Arts 24–25 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility.

  27. 27.

    Art 51 AP I 1977 to GC 1949.

  28. 28.

    Art 57 AP I 1977 to GC 1949.

  29. 29.

    This was the fate of the bridges across the Danube in Belgrade, destroyed by NATO in 1999 during Operation Allied Force.

  30. 30.

    The bridge shown in Fig. 1 is a combined rail/road bridge in the old harbour of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada. The photo was taken in 2008 by this writer while the bridge was being raised to allow a ship to pass underneath.

  31. 31.

    General Michael Hayden, a former director of the National Security Agency and CIA in the US, estimated that the worm cost an estimated US$1 million to create. http://www.thenational.ae/business/industry-insights/technology/former-cia-chief-speaks-out-on-iran-stuxnet-attack Accessed 13 Dec 2016.

  32. 32.

    While viruses require some user action (e.g. opening of an e-mail attachment), worms do not.

  33. 33.

    Art 44 AP 1 1977.

  34. 34.

    Art 1 Hague Regulations on the Rules and Customs of War on Land = Annex to the IV Hague Convention 1907.

  35. 35.

    See e.g. https://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/2/Cyber_Command/ Accessed 13 Dec 2016.

  36. 36.

    Art 13 GC 1949 I and II.

  37. 37.

    Art 43 para 1 AP I 1977.

  38. 38.

    Art 58 AP I 1977.

References

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  • Ziolkowski K (2012) Ius ad bellum in cyberspace – some thoughts on the “Schmitt Criteria” fort the use of force. In: Czosseck C, Ottis R, Ziolkowski K (eds) 4th international conference on cyber conflict, Tallinn. See https://ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedings/5_3_Ziolkowski_IusAdBellumInCyberspace.pdf

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Correspondence to Sigmar Stadlmeier .

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Stadlmeier, S. (2018). CPU and Keyboard: Weapons of Mass Disruption?. In: Heintschel von Heinegg, W., Frau, R., Singer, T. (eds) Dehumanization of Warfare. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67266-3_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67266-3_9

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