Sensitivity Analyses on the Effect of Legal Rules Variation on Economic and Financial Performance

  • Daniel Oto-Peralías
  • Diego Romero-Ávila
Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)


This chapter presents several robustness checks so as to determine whether the lack of a clear-cut impact of legal rules and regulatory indicators on economic and financial performance holds for alternative legal indicators, some of which extend over lengthier periods than the Doing Business indicators. Other sensitivity analyses entail the use of alternative estimators such as the difference GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (Rev Econ Stud 58(2):277–297) and the system GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (J Econ 68(1):29–51). The lack of effect of legal rules and regulatory indicators on financial and economic performance may indicate the existence of a gap between intended legal and regulatory reforms and the reality on the ground.


Robustness analysis Legal change Financial and economic performance GMM panel estimation 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Oto-Peralías
    • 1
  • Diego Romero-Ávila
    • 2
  1. 1.School of ManagementUniversity of St AndrewsSt AndrewsUK
  2. 2.Department of Economics, Quantitative Methods and Economic HistoryPablo de Olavide UniversitySevilleSpain

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