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Reputation for Complex Societies

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Part of the Understanding Complex Systems book series (UCS)

Abstract

Reputation, the germ of gossip, is addressed in this chapter as a distributed instrument for social order. In literature, reputation is shown to promote (a) social control in cooperative contexts—like social groups and subgroups—and (b) partner selection in competitive ones, like (e-) markets and industrial districts. Current technology that affects, employs and extends reputation, applied to electronic markets or multi-agent systems, is discussed in light of its theoretical background. In order to compare reputation systems with their original analogue, a social cognitive model of reputation is presented. The application of the model to the theoretical study of norm-abiding behaviour and partner selection are discussed, as well as the refinement and improvement of current reputation technology. The chapter concludes with remarks and ideas for future research.

Keywords

  • Agent-based models
  • Cognitive modelling
  • Image
  • Reputation
  • Social simulation
  • Trusts

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Notes

  1. 1.

    According to the US-based Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), losses as a result of auto-auction fraud exceeded $8.2 million dollars in 2011.

  2. 2.

    A belief or a goal is social when it mentions another agent and possibly one or more of his or her mental states (for an in-depth discussion of these notions, see Conte and Castelfranchi 1995; Conte 1999).

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Jordi Sabater and Samuele Marmo for their helpful collaboration. This work was partially supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Scientific Research under the Firb programme (Socrate project, contract number RBNE03Y338) and by the European Community under the FP6 programme (eRep project, contract number CIT5-028575; EMIL project, contract number IST-FP6-33841).

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Further Reading

Further Reading

For a more in-depth treatment of the contents of this chapter, we refer the reader to the monograph Reputation in Artificial Societies (Conte and Paolucci 2002). For more on the same line of research, with an easier presentation aimed to dissemination, we suggest the booklet published as the result of the eRep project (Paolucci et al. 2009). More recently, Hendrikx, Bubendorfer and Chard (2014) published a review of existing reputation systems, and the book by Bertino and Matei (2014) illustrated a project for the study of reputation in Wikipedia.

Due to the focus on the theoretical background of reputation, only a narrow selection of simulation models of reputation could be discussed in this chapter. Sabater and Sierra (2004) give a detailed and well-informed overview of current models of trust and reputation using a variety of mechanisms. Another good starting point for the reader interested in different models and mechanisms is the review by Ramchurn and colleagues (Ramchurn et al. 2004).

Further advanced issues for specialized reputation subfields can be found in Jøsang et al. (2007), a review of online trust and reputation systems, and in Koenig et al. (2008), regarding the Internet of Services approach to Grid Computing.

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Giardini, F., Conte, R., Paolucci, M. (2017). Reputation for Complex Societies. In: Edmonds, B., Meyer, R. (eds) Simulating Social Complexity. Understanding Complex Systems. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66948-9_18

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