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Confronting the Forces of Self-Deception

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Toward a Phenomenology of Addiction: Embodiment, Technology, Transcendence

Part of the book series: Contributions To Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 93))

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Abstract

This chapter examines what in popular terms is described as the problem of “co-dependency.” The tendency toward “denial” not only occurs on the side of the individual struggling with addiction, but also on the side of the companion (whether spouse, family member, friend, or colleague) who seeks to extend help. We will discover that these deceptive practices form a web entangling addict and enablers alike, so as to both mask the problem as a problem, on the one hand, and, on the other, foster a climate of co-dependency.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Schalow 2006, pp. 13–23.

  2. 2.

    Kovacs 1982, pp . 211–213 .

  3. 3.

    Boss 1949, p. 47 .

  4. 4.

    Stolorow 2013, p. 453 .

  5. 5.

    Heidegger 2001, p. 137.

  6. 6.

    For a physiological account of the “depressive” effects of alcohol on the nervous system, see Erickson 2007, pp . 121–122.

  7. 7.

    Heidegger 2000, p. 142.

  8. 8.

    Heidegger 1976, “Was ist Metaphysik?”, p. 112.

  9. 9.

    See Wilshire 2003, pp . 3–7.

  10. 10.

    Heidegger 2001, pp. 86–87.

  11. 11.

    See Levin, 1987, “Introduction,” pp. 1–17.

  12. 12.

    Heidegger 1977b/1962 p. 163; tr. 158.

  13. 13.

    See Seeburger 1993, pp. 52–55.

  14. 14.

    Pinsky 2003, p. 158.

  15. 15.

    Pinsky 2003, p. 159.

  16. 16.

    See Heidegger 2001 , pp. 138, 200–202.

  17. 17.

    For a discussion of how sexual addiction can be classified as medical and psychological disorder, the statistics to show how much of the US population might be affected (e.g., 5%), see Khaleghi and Khaleghi 2011, p. 10.

  18. 18.

    Boss 1949, pp. 145–146 .

  19. 19.

    See Scott 1990, pp. 131–141.

  20. 20.

    One of the distinct advantages of bringing Heidegger’s discourse to bear on the study of addiction is that we not only illuminate a vexing problem, but also can appreciate the fragile basis on which a search for a “treatment” has historically rested. For Heidegger also stands out as a historian of thought, whose example inquiry paves the way to uncover the presumptions underlying our basic beliefs. The importing of the framework of the Oxford Group as a spiritual recipe, as we will see in Chapter Six, for a possible treatment for addiction has a “presumptive” character uniquely its own. Specifically, how can a physically rooted pathology be overcome, or at least managed, through the practice of a “spiritual” discipline? Yet, if holding to presumptions are not “wrong,” it is precisely the mission of philosophy to dig underneath them and unearth both their source of truth as well as their potential for errancy .

  21. 21.

    de Spinoza 1961, p . 329.

  22. 22.

    Pinksy 2003, p. 159.

  23. 23.

    Heidegger 1977b/1962, pp. 259–260; tr. 240.

  24. 24.

    Zimmerman 1995, p . 503.

  25. 25.

    B. (Dick) 1998, p. 136.

  26. 26.

    Guignon 2000, 96.

  27. 27.

    For further discussion, See James Aho and Kevin Aho 2008, pp. 151ff. pp. 149–154.

  28. 28.

    Kovacs 2013, p. 315. On a positive side, trauma can provide a catalyst for disclosing the self’s finitude , despite, or even because of, the negativity of its affect and the accompanying attunement of anxiety (Angst). See Stolorow 2013, pp. 454–455.

  29. 29.

    Carolton Erickson suggests that for women trauma may play a greater role as a causative factor in chemical dependence, thereby raising the question of “gender-specific” treatment. Erickson 2007, p. 212.

  30. 30.

    Khaleghi and Khaleghi 2011, pp. 18–20.

  31. 31.

    Romanyshyn and Whalen, in Levin (ed.), 1987, pp. 189–220. This article provides an excellent account of the “American dream” as forming the backdrop of Bill Wilson ’s culture, the tension between the struggle for material success and the “uprootedness ” of urban life.

  32. 32.

    Kemp 2009, pp. 1–18.

  33. 33.

    See Pinsky 2003, pp. 197–198.

  34. 34.

    Heidegger 1985. In his lectures from the Summer Semester of 1936, Heidegger describes the self as perched on the precipice of the “highest heaven and the deepest abyss” (pp. 177–178). Also see Heidegger, 1977a, pp. 31–34.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA, USA

    Frank Schalow

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Schalow, F. (2017). Confronting the Forces of Self-Deception. In: Toward a Phenomenology of Addiction: Embodiment, Technology, Transcendence. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 93. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66942-7_4

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