The Missing Link in the Evolution of Zoning

Chapter

Abstract

The centennial of the 1916 New York City Building Zone Resolution provides an exceptional opportunity to reconsider the regulatory and legal basis upon which the key governmental power of zoning is founded. The motive to control the various market externalities embedded in land use regulation, from effects on commercial activity to changes in housing prices, has practically guided local governments in the United States from the very first days of zoning. Yet at the same time, such considerations of market externalities remained in the shadows of explicit zoning law and policy, as the discussion was re-routed to the allegedly more stable foundations of zoning, such as control of environmental, fiscal, or social externalities. This chapter identifies the missing link in the evolution of zoning, showing how the control of market externalities has had an unsung yet powerful impact on the zoning power from its early days.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Radzyner Law School, Gazit-Globe Real Estate Institute, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) HerzliyaHerzliyaIsrael

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