Abstract
Perhaps no one has written more extensively, more deeply, and more insightfully about determinism and freedom than Ted Honderich. His influence and legacy with regard to the problem of free will—or the determinism problem, as he prefers to frame it—loom large. In these comments I would like to focus on two main aspects of Honderich’s work: (1) his defense of determinism and its consequences for origination and moral responsibility; and (2) his concern that the truth of determinism threatens and restricts, but does not eliminate, our life-hopes. In many ways, I see my own defense of free will skepticism as the natural successor to Honderich’s work. There are, however, some small differences between us. My goal in this chapter is to clarify our areas of agreement and disagreement and to acknowledge my enormous debt to Ted. If I can also move him toward my own more optimistic brand of free will skepticism, then that would be great too.
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Caruso, G.D. (2018). Origination, Moral Responsibility, and Life-Hopes: Ted Honderich on Determinism and Freedom. In: Caruso, G. (eds) Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66754-6_11
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