Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10504)


We revisit the inefficiency of the uniform price auction, one of the standard multi-unit auction formats, for allocating multiple units of a single good. In the uniform price auction, each bidder submits a sequence of non-increasing marginal bids, one for each additional unit. The per unit price is then set to be the highest losing bid. We focus on the pure Nash equilibria of such auctions, for bidders with submodular valuation functions. Our result is a tight upper and lower bound on the inefficiency of equilibria, showing that the Price of Anarchy is bounded by 2.188. This resolves one of the open questions posed in previous works on multi-unit auctions.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of InformaticsAthens University of Economics and BusinessAthensGreece
  2. 2.Department of Digital SystemsUniversity of PiraeusPiraeusGreece

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