SAGT 2017: Algorithmic Game Theory pp 186-198

# The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10504)

## Abstract

Best response (BR) dynamics is a natural method by which players proceed toward a pure Nash equilibrium via a local search method. The quality of the equilibrium reached may depend heavily on the order by which players are chosen to perform their best response moves. A deviator rule S is a method for selecting the next deviating player. We provide a measure for quantifying the performance of different deviator rules. The inefficiency of a deviator rule S with respect to an initial strategy profile p is the ratio between the social cost of the worst equilibrium reachable by S from p and the social cost of the best equilibrium reachable from p. The inefficiency of S is the maximum such ratio over all possible initial profiles. This inefficiency always lies between 1 and the price of anarchy.

We study the inefficiency of various deviator rules in network formation games and job scheduling games (both are congestion games, where BR dynamics always converges to a pure NE). For some classes of games, we compute optimal deviator rules. Furthermore, we define and study a new class of deviator rules, called local deviator rules. Such rules choose the next deviator as a function of a restricted set of parameters, and satisfy a natural independence condition called independence of irrelevant players. We present upper bounds on the inefficiency of some local deviator rules, and also show that for some classes of games, no local deviator rule can guarantee inefficiency lower than the price of anarchy.

## Keywords

Congestion games Best-response dynamics Deviator rules Price of anarchy

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