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Is My Attack Tree Correct?

  • Maxime Audinot
  • Sophie Pinchinat
  • Barbara Kordy
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10492)

Abstract

Attack trees are a popular way to represent and evaluate potential security threats on systems or infrastructures. The goal of this work is to provide a framework allowing to express and check whether an attack tree is consistent with the analyzed system. We model real systems using transition systems and introduce attack trees with formally specified node labels. We formulate the correctness properties of an attack tree with respect to a system and study the complexity of the corresponding decision problems. The proposed framework can be used in practice to assist security experts in manual creation of attack trees and enhance development of tools for automated generation of attack trees.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maxime Audinot
    • 1
    • 2
  • Sophie Pinchinat
    • 1
    • 2
  • Barbara Kordy
    • 1
    • 3
  1. 1.IRISARennesFrance
  2. 2.University Rennes 1RennesFrance
  3. 3.INSA RennesRennesFrance

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