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The Once and Future Onion

  • Paul Syverson
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10492)

Abstract

Onionsites are Internet sites accessed via protocols offering security protections beyond those provided by the usual protocols and infrastructure of the Internet, such as confidentiality of address lookup, and that significantly strengthen commonly offered protections; for example, their self-authenticating addresses preclude the kinds of certificate hijacks that have occurred against registered domain names. I will sketch the properties and design of onion services, including early history as well as recent developments. I will also describe integration of onionsites much more fully into conventional Internet sites in ways that promote their general widescale adoption.

Notes

Acknowledgments

More people have helped shape the work and ideas I have described above than could be acknowledged here. Specific thanks to Richard Barnes for conversations that led to the ideas for subdomain onions, and to Matt Traudt and Ryan Wails for helpful comments on a draft of this paper.

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Copyright information

© US Government 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.U.S. Naval Research LaboratoryWashington, DCUSA

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