Cryptographic security is usually defined as a guarantee that holds except when a bad event with negligible probability occurs, and nothing is guaranteed in that case. However, in settings where a failure can happen with substantial probability, one needs to provide guarantees even for the bad case. A typical example is where a (possibly weak) password is used instead of a secure cryptographic key to protect a session, the bad event being that the adversary correctly guesses the password. In a situation with multiple such sessions, a per-session guarantee is desired: any session for which the password has not been guessed remains secure, independently of whether other sessions have been compromised.
Our contributions are two-fold. First, we provide a new, general technique for stating security guarantees that degrade gracefully and which could not be expressed with existing formalisms. Our method is simple, does not require new security definitions, and can be carried out in any simulation-based security framework (thus providing composability). Second, we apply our approach to revisit the analysis of password-based message authentication and of password-based (symmetric) encryption (PBE), investigating whether they provide strong per-session guarantees.
In the case of PBE, one would intuitively expect a weak form of confidentiality, where a transmitted message only leaks to the adversary once the underlying password is guessed. Indeed, we show that PBE does achieve this weak confidentiality if an upper-bound on the number of adversarial password-guessing queries is known in advance for each session. However, such local restrictions appear to be questionable in reality and, quite surprisingly, we show that in a more realistic scenario the desired per-session confidentiality is unachievable.
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