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Using an Assurance Case Framework to Develop Security Strategy and Policies

  • Robin BloomfieldEmail author
  • Peter Bishop
  • Eoin Butler
  • Kate Netkachova
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10489)

Abstract

Assurance cases have been developed to reason and communicate about the trustworthiness of systems. Recently we have also been using them to support the development of policy and to assess the impact of security issues on safety regulation. In the example we present in this paper, we worked with a safety regulator (anonymised as A Regulatory Organisation (ARO) in this paper) to investigate the impact of cyber-security on safety regulation.

Keywords

Security-informed safety Assurance cases Regulation Risk assessment 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work has been partially supported by the UK EPSRC project “Communicating and Evaluating Cyber Risk and Dependencies” (CEDRICS, EP/M002802/1), which is part of the UK Research Institute in Trustworthy Industrial Control Systems (RiTICS).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robin Bloomfield
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Peter Bishop
    • 1
    • 2
  • Eoin Butler
    • 2
  • Kate Netkachova
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Centre for Software ReliabilityCity, University of LondonLondonUK
  2. 2.Adelard LLPLondonUK

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