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Modular Verification of Information Flow Security in Component-Based Systems

  • Simon GreinerEmail author
  • Martin Mohr
  • Bernhard Beckert
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10469)

Abstract

We propose a novel method for the verification of information flow security in component-based systems. The method is (a) modular w.r.t. services and components, i.e., overall security is proved to follow from the security of the individual services provided by the components, and (b) modular w.r.t. attackers, i.e., verified security properties can be re-used to demonstrate security w.r.t. different kinds of attacks.

In a first step, user-provided security specifications for individual services are verified using program analysis techniques. In a second step, first-order formulas are generated expressing that component non-interference follows from service-level properties and in a third step that global system security follows from component non-interference. These first-order proof obligations are discharged with a first-order theorem prover. The overall approach is independent of the programming language used to implement the components. We provide a soundness proof for our method and highlight its advantages, especially in the context of evolving systems.

As a proof of concept and to demonstrate the usability of our method, we present a case study, where we verify the security of a system implemented in Java against two types of attackers. We apply the program verification system KeY and the program analysis tool Joana for analyzing individual services; modularity of our approach allows us to use them in parallel.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of InformaticsKarlsruhe Institute of TechnologyKarlsruheGermany

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