The Obligation of Practicing Due Diligence in the Carriage of Goods by Sea

Chacón, Víctor Hugo

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66002-8_3

Víctor Hugo Chacón³

Part of the book series: Springer Series on Naval Architecture, Marine Engineering, Shipbuilding and Shipping ((NAMESS,volume 5))

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1 Citations

Abstract

This part deals primarily with the obligations that, according to the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, every carrier subject to them must practice. It is firstly presented the introduction or adoption of the rules in American, English and German legislations. Then, it develops the construction that has been given to the fundamental concepts of due diligence, seaworthiness and cargo care. The explanation of the same is made in light of the American and English jurisprudence. There is no doubt that these two nations were leaders in maritime transport for most of the last century, so the decisions made by their courts, analising such duties, have come to complement the gaps and uncertainties of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. As explained, the rules impose to practice “due diligence”. What should be understood by such an obligations? There have been some doubts if said duty should be understood as to perform due diligence or reasonable diligence; or, if there is a difference between diligence and care. In this regard, some contributions are presented to elucidate this apparent conflict. Regarding the concept of seawothiness, this has been widely discussed and fragmented into various aspects, considering the different elements of the ship and the maritime adventure as well. This deals with both legal and technical aspects, paying special attention to the implications that technology has had on them. Finally, passing from the ship to the cargo, it addresses the duty to protect the cargo that under the same regulations every carrier must meet.

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Notes

1.
CMI Yearbook 2013, 599–601.
2.
Wilson, 186–187.
3.
For a larger comparative analysis of some more national laws See Ziegler, 41–60.
4.
Honnold, 102.
5.
CMI Yearbook 2013, 601.
6.
Hughes, 205.
7.
Colinvaux, v. See supra note. 532.
8.
[1932] AC 328.
9.
Ibid., 350.
10.
This opinion was also cited in Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd. v. Can. Government Merchant Marine. [1959] AC 589 (PC); The Muncaster Castle [1961] AC 807, 874; The Rafaela S, [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 113 (CA).
11.
Tetley, Interpretation and Construction…, 55–56, citing Francosteel Corp. v. Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschppij 249 Cal. App.2d 880, 889, 1897 A.M.C. 2440, 2448 (Cal. App. 1967), cert. denied, 389 US 931 (1967); Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd. 603 F.2d 1327, 1338, 1979 A.M.C. 2787, 2802-03 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 US 1012, 1980 A.M.C. 2102 (1980).
12.
Scrutton and Eder, 401.
13.
W. Tetley, B. G. McDonough and E. B. Nixon, Marine cargo claims, 3rd edn. (Montreal, QC, Canada: International Shipping Publications, BLAIS, 1988), 1098.
14.
Ibid., 1098.
15.
Section 1(2).
16.
As stated by Lord Diplock in The Hollandia [1983] 1 AC 565 (HL).
17.
[1983] 1 A.C. 565, as quoted by Hughes, 205.
18.
Tetley, McDonough and Nixon, at 205: “It has been held that a choice of forum clause indicating a jurisdiction which would apply a lower package/unit limitation (that of the HR) is invalid under Art. III(8) which, like the rest of the Rules, has the force of law: The Hollandia, [1983] 1 A.C. 565. It is not clear whether a choice of law clause affected by this reasoning would be entirely invalid, or merely invalid as regards matters regulated by the Rules.”
19.
Section 1(3).
20.
Tetley, McDonough and Nixon, 205; Section 1(4).
21.
Section 1(6).
22.
Pyrene Co. Ltd. v. Scindia Navigation Co. Ltd. [1954] 2 QB 402.
23.
Girvin, at 421: “There shall not be implied in any contract for the carriage of foods by sea to which the rules apply by virtue of this Act any absolute undertaking by the carrier of the goods to provide a seaworthy ship”.
24.
Hughes, 43.
25.
May v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Aktiengesellschaft, 290 U.S. 333, 54 S.Ct. 162, 7 L.Ed. 533 (1933).
26.
Matter of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., S.A. 513 F. Supp. 148, 157, 1981 A.M.C. 2350 (E.D.La.).
27.
In Herd & Co. Inc. V. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 US 297, 301, 1959 A.M.C. 879, 882–83 The US Supreme Court acknowledged that “The legislative history of the Act shows that it was lifted almost bodily from the Hague Rules of 1921, as amended by the Brussels Convention of 1924, 51 Statt. 233. The effect of those Rules was to establish uniform ocean bills of lading to govern the right and liabilities of carriers and shippers iter se in international trade.”
28.
Tetley, McDonough and Nixon, 1101.
29.
Sturley, Changing Liability Rules…, 120.
30.
Ibid., 120.
31.
Gilmore and Black, JR., 144.
32.
Ibid., 147.
33.
Ibid., 147.
34.
Mangone, 85.
35.
Gilmore and Black, JR., 147.
36.
Ibid. “Cogsa expressly saves Harter from repeal in so far as it applies to the periods prior to loading and after discharge from the ship. Thus, in the absence of stipulation, Harter still applies: (1) To all “coastwide” trade –that is, to bills of lading covering shipments by water from one port of the United States to another. (2) To the period, even in foreign trade, during which the carrier has custody of the goods, before they are loaded on the ship and after they are unloaded from the ship.”
37.
Tetley, McDonough and Nixon, 1101.
38.
Section 1(c).
39.
Gilmore and Black, JR., 145.
40.
Ibid., 147.
41.
Mangone, 84.
42.
Gilmore and Black, JR., 149.
43.
Mangone, 87.
44.
Schoenbaum, 891–892.
45.
Gilmore and Black, JR., 148–149. The concept of seaworthiness, for example, has not a different meaning in the two acts.
46.
49 U.S.C. § 8010.
47.
49 U.S.C. § 11706.
48.
Mangone, 79.
49.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 2, 2601.
50.
R. Herber, Seehandelsrecht: Systematische Darstellung (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1999), 30; Ziegler, 52.
51.
Ziegler, 53.
52.
Ibid., 54. This Act was enacted on the 25th of July 1986 amending the previous regulation.
53.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 2, 2464; Ziegler, 53.
54.
Ziegler, 54.
55.
H. J. Abraham, Das Seerecht: Ein Grundriss mit Hinweisen auf d. Sonderrechte anderer Verkehrsmittel, vornehml. d. Binnenschiffahrts- u. Luftrecht, 4th edn. (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1974), 179.
56.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 2, 876. See Bundesgerishtshof, February 28, 1983, [1984] ETL 342, at 349: “Nun liegt hier allerdings ein Fall anfänglicher Ladungsuntüchtigkeit eines Schiffes vor. Von der Haftung hierfür können sich aber der Verfrachter, der Reeder oder der Kapitän durch Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen, zu denen auch die vorformulierten Bedingungen einer Charterpartie zu rechnen sind (§ 1Abs. 1 AGBG) nicht wirksam freizeichnen“.
57.
Commercial Code in the revised version published in the Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl., Federal Law Gazette), Part III, Section 4100-1, Book 1, as amended by Article 3 of the Act of 22 December 2015 (Federal Law Gazette Part I p. 2567), and Book 5, as amended by Article 1 of the Act of 20 April 2013 (BGBl. I p. 831). Translation from German provided by the Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_hgb/englisch_hgb.html#p0018. Last visited May 30th, 2017.
58.
D. Rabe, Seehandelsrecht: Fünftes Buch des Handelsgesetzbuches mit Nebenvorschriften und internationalen Übereinkommen, 4th edn. (München: Beck, 2000), 405.
59.
Ibid. 405. The former Article 606 related to damage directly to the cargo not necessarily caused by unseaworthiness: “606. Der Verfrachter ist verpflichtet, beim Einladen, Stauen, Befördern, Behandeln und Ausladen der Güter mit der Sorgfalt eines ordentliches Verfrachters zu verfahren. Er haftet für den Schaden, der durch Verlust oder Beschädigung der Güter in der Zeit von der Annahme bis zur Ablieferung entsteht, es sei denn, dass der Verlust oder die Beschädigung auf Umständen beruht, die durch die Sorgfalt eines ordentlichen Verfrachter nicht abgewendet werden konnten”.
60.
Ibid. 246, It is comparable to the GENCON 2 charter party model.
61.
Commercial Code in the revised version published in the Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl., Federal Law Gazette), Part III, Section 4100-1, Book 1, as amended by Article 3 of the Act of 22 December 2015 (Federal Law Gazette Part I p. 2567), and Book 5, as amended by Article 1 of the Act of 20 April 2013 (BGBl. I p. 831). Translation from German provided by the Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_hgb/englisch_hgb.html#p0018. Last visited May 30th, 2017.
62.
The former Article 513 of the HGB stated that the master had to ensure before the voyage that the ship is seaworthy, properly furnished, equiped, crewed and provisioned, and that all the documents related to the ship, the crew and the cargo are on board: “Der Kapitän hat vor dem Antritte der Reise dafür zu sorgen, dass das Schiff in seetüchtigem Stande, gehörig eingerichtet und ausgerüstet, gehörig bemmant und verproviantiert ist und dass die zum Ausweise für Schiff, Besatzung und Ladung erforderlichen Papiere an Bord sind“; H. J. Abraham, Das Seerecht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Kommentar und Materialsammlung, Großkommentare der Praxis, 4th edn. (Berlin [u.a.]: de Gruyter, 1978), 491.
63.
Rabe, 404.
64.
Ibid., 246.
65.
H. C. M. Black, A Law Dictionary, 2nd. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1910), 405. See Heaven v. Pender, (1883)11 QBD 506; Smith v. Clarke Hardware Co., 100 Ga. 163, 28 S. E. 73, 39 L. R. A. 607; Cleveland, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO., v. Railroad Co., v. Ballentine, 84 Fed. 935, 28 C.C.A. 572 (C.A. 7 1898).
66.
Koh, 110.
67.
Clarke, 204, citing Mazeaud, Rev. Trimestrielle de Driot Civil 1936. I no. 48.
68.
Black, 369. This definition has been used in some more recent American cases such as C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc.v. M/V Hans Leonhardt, 719 F. Supp. 479, 504, 1990 A.M.C. 733, 743 (E.D.La. 1989).
69.
Imperial Shipping Committee issued in 1921 suggested the unification of laws in the British dominions to be based on this Act. See supra a) History of its Adoption; note 481.
70.
43 O.L.R. 330, 344–345 (Ont. S.C. App. Div.), upheld (1919) 59 S.C.R. 643 (Supr. C. of Can.).
71.
Knauth, 122.
72.
Clarke, 205.
73.
Ibid., 205; Wilson, 188. See The Amstelslot [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 223, 235.
74.
See M/V Tuxpan Lim. Procs., 765 F. Supp. 1150, 1179, (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Also refers to General Foods Corp. v. The Troubador, 98 F. Supp. 207, 210 (S.D.N.Y.1951).
75.
Garner and Black, 523.
76.
Ibid., 523.
77.
Black, 400.
78.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 370.
79.
Clarke, 205. He refers to Aubrun and Audouin. He points also that however Aubrum remarked that it is not a meticulous and extraordinary diligence. This opinion was also followed by Marais and Rouen.
80.
171 U. S. 192, 193, sub nom. Flint v. Christall, 43 L.Ed. 132, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 833. (1898).
81.
Indeed in The Friesland 104 F. 99 (D.C.N.Y. 1900) two cases were cited where the level of inspection required as part of the due diligence obligation seemed higher, at 100: “In the case of The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U.S. 199, 215, 14 Sup.Ct. 823, 38 L.Ed. 688, it was held to be the duty of the owner to make such necessary and proper inspection from time to time as might give assurance of the seaworthiness of the vessel; and in The Phoenicia (D.C.) 90 Fed. 116, affirmed in 40 C.C.A. 221, 99 Fed. 1005, the absence of a thorough and careful inspection, it was held, made the ship chargeable with the loss.”
82.
Black, 994.
83.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 876. The Kapitan Sakharov [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255.
84.
[2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719.
85.
98 F. Supp. 207, 210 (S.D.N.Y.1951).
86.
765 F. Supp. 1150, 1179, (S.D. N.Y. 1991).
87.
213 F. Supp. 352, 1963 A.M.C. 649 (D.C.Or. 1962).
88.
Ibid., 356, for this statement the court also cited the following cases: Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed.2d 941 (1960); Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 348 U.S. 336, 75 S.Ct. 382, 99 L.Ed. 354 (1955); Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 81 S.Ct. 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 20 (1960).
89.
Clarke, 210, quoting Dimitrios N. Rallias (1922) 13 Ll.L.R. 363, at 366: “Even assuming that (the surveyors) were not negligent, if this could have been discovered by ordinary care then the defendant does not come within the protection of the bill of lading”.
90.
Ibid., 210.
91.
[1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 336.
92.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 929.
93.
Garner and Black, 523, 574, 1380.
94.
Ibid., 240.
95.
W. A. Jowitt and J. Burke, Jowitt's dictionary of English law, 2nd edn. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1977), 614.
96.
Scrutton and Eder, 424.
97.
Girvin, 423.
98.
[1960] I QB 536, 581.
99.
Clarke, 203–204, citing The Muncaster Castle [1961] A.C. 807, 862; Jolowics 1960 Camb. L.J. 17, 1961 Camb. L.J. 165. Riska pp. 94, 102. Cf. Villareal 2 J. Mar. L. & Com. 763.
100.
Ibid., 204. See Leesh River Tea Co. v. B.I.S.N. [1967] 2 QB 250, 277.
101.
[1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 223.
102.
Ibid., 235.
103.
Supra note 84; Girvin, 423.
104.
Note, ‘Three Degrees of Negligence’, at 655: “Prior to the publication of the essay of Sir William Jones it has no existence in the English Law, except as directly and wholly traceable to the Roman law.”
105.
Ibid., 668.
106.
Jowwit, Earl and Walsh, Clifford. “Jowwitt’s Dictionary of English Law”. 2nd. Edition, Sueer & Maxwell Limited, 1977, 614, 669.
107.
See McFadden v. Blue Star Line (1905) 1 K.B. 697, at 706 Judge Channell quoted a passage of Carver on Carriage by Sea (s. 18) stating: “…the vessel ‘must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary careful and prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage having regard to all the probable circumstances of it.’”.
108.
Editorial, ‘Seaworthiness—the ilussion of the Hague compromise’ (2006) 12, The Journal of International Maritime Law, 87–8, 87. See FC Bradley & Sons v. Federal Steam Navigation Co. [1926] 24 Ll.L.Rep. 446, at 454: ‘The ship must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary careful owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage having regard to all the probable circumstances of it. Would a prudent owner have required that it (sc the defect) be made good before sending his ship to sea, had he known of it?”.
109.
See MDC Ltd. v. NV Zeevaart Maatschapij Beursstraat (1962) [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 180, at 186: “…and the most common test is: Would a prudent shipowner, if he had known of the defect, have sent the ship to sea in that condition?”.
110.
See M/V Tuxpan Lim. Procs. 765 F. Supp. 1150, 1179, (S.D.N.Y. 1991). See also General Foods Corp. v. The Troubador, 98 F. Supp. 207, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
111.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 876. Tetley cites the Canadian case Grain Growers Export Co. v. Canada Steamship Lines Ltd. (1918) 43 O.L.R. 330 at 344–345 (Ont. S.C. App. Div.), upheld (1919) 59 S.C.R. 643 (Supr. C. of Can.); Longley, 62, citing The Southwark 191 U.S. 1, 15, 24 S.Ct. 1, 48 L.Ed. 65 (1903); The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U.S. 199, 215, 14 S. Ct. 823, 38 L.Ed. 688 (1894); The Esso Providence, 112 F. Supp. 631, 1953 A.M.C. 1317 (S.D.N.Y.).
112.
Editorial, 87.
113.
Ibid., 87.
114.
Ibid., 87.
115.
Gilmore and Black, JR., 152.
116.
UK Marine Insurance Act 1906, s. 39 (4).
117.
Ibid., 154.
118.
19 How. (60 U.S.) 162, 167, 15. L.Ed. 584 (1856).
119.
Ibid., 167.
120.
(1876) 1 QBD 377; Wilson, 9.
121.
Ibid., 380.
122.
See The Sylvia, 171 U. S. 462, 43 L. Ed. 241, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7. (1898).
123.
191 U.S. 1, 24 S.Ct. 1, 48 L.Ed. 65 (1903).
124.
Ibid., 8–9, See Bouvier Law Dictionary, 2nd Edition, Vol. 2, 506. Also in H. R. Baer, Admiralty Law of the Supreme Court, 3rd edn. (Charlottesville, Va: Michie Co., 1979), 500.
125.
See Empresa Cubana Importadora de Alimentos Alimport v. Iasmos Shipping Co. S.A. (The Good Friend). [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 586, at 592 defines de concept of seaworthiness as: “used in the ordinary meaning, and not in any extended or unnatural meaning. It means that the vessel –with her master and crew—is herself fit to encounter the perils of the voyage and also that she is fit to carry the cargo safely on the voyage”. Also in: Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd. V. Malasyan International Shipping Corp. Berhard (The Bunga Seroja) [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 512 (HCA), at 86; The Gang Cheng (1998) 6 MLJ 488; Actis Steamship Co. Ltd. v. The Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd., (The Aquacharm) [1982] 1WLR 119 (CA); Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, at 877: “The state of the vessel in such a condition, with such equipment, and manned by such a master and crew, that normally the cargo will be loaded, carried, cared for and discharge properly and safely on the contemplated voyage.”
126.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 903. See The Temple Bar 45 F. Supp. 608 (D. Md. 1942), at 617, 1942 A.M.C. 1125, at 1139: “…if the facts in any case disclose unseaworthiness resulting from the vessel owner's failure to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, which concur with negligent navigation in causing the loss, the owner will be liable. That is to say, unseaworthiness cannot be transformed into bad seamanship for the purpose of avoiding responsibility for loss of vessel or cargo.”
127.
Ibid., 903. See The Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719, 737.
128.
[1959] A.C. 589, [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 105 (P.C.).
129.
Ibid., 602–03 or 113.
130.
[1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 257, affirmed by the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) at [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 506.
131.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 882, quoting The Fiona at 286: “The exceptions in art. IV, r. 6 are clearly in my judgment subject to the performance by the carrier of his overriding obligation set out in art. III, r. 1. So also in my judgment is the right to an indemnity conferred by the first paragraph of the rule” (Emphasis by Tetley).
132.
[1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 512.
133.
Girvin, 429.
134.
Scrutton and Eder, 423.
135.
Baer, 503.
136.
82 F. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1897), at 678: “This section [Section 3 of the Harter Act] has been in several cases adjudged to require due diligence, not merely in the personal acts of the owner, but also on the part of the agents he may employ, or to whom he may have committed the work of fitting the vessel for sea. The act requires in other words, due diligence in the work itself.”
137.
Also in Federazione Italiana Dei Consorzi Agrari v. Mandask Compania De Vapores, S.A., 284 F. Supp. 356, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 388 F.2d 434 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828, 89 S.Ct. 92, 21 L.Ed.2d 99 (1968); In re Marine Sulphur Transport Corp., 312 F. Supp. 1081, 1105 (S.D.N.Y.1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 460 F.2d 89 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982, 93 S.Ct. 318, 34 L.Ed.2d 246 (1972); Complaint of Tecomar S.A. 765 F. Supp. 1150, 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
138.
181 U.S. 218, 45 L.Ed. 830, 21 S. Ct. 591. (1901), at 225: “We do not think that a shipowner exercises due diligence within the meaning of the act by merely furnishing proper structure and equipment, for the diligence required is diligence to make the ship in all respects seaworthy, and that, in our judgment, means due diligence on the part of all the owner’s servants in the use of the equipment before the commencement of the voyage and until it is actually commenced.”
139.
Schoenbaum, 893. See Cerro Sales, Corp. v. Atlantic Marine Enterprises Inc., 403 F. Supp. 562, 1976 A.M.C. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
140.
Ibid., 893, note 15. See The Point Brava, 1 F. Supp. 1150, 1991 A.M.C. 2432 (S.D.N.Y.).
141.
[1961] A.C. 807, [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 57. Baer, at 506: “[this case] was said to be the first decision in which the Hague Rules were discussed by an English court since their adoption in the Australian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.”
142.
Longley, at 65: “As the result of the negligence of one of the shipyard employees, when the vessel was returned to her owner she had a defect which, on the subsequent voyage, caused damage to cargo.”
143.
[1961] AC 807, 844.
144.
Ibid., 872.
145.
Girvin, at 424: “…it was one of the issues for revision considered by the CMI at its Conference at Rijeka in 1959 and at its Stockholm Conference in 1953…. However, at the later Diplomatic Conference at Brussels in 1967 and 1968, the amendment was rejected…” See supra (1). The Visby Amendment –The Brussels Protocol of 1968.
146.
See Union of India v. N. V Reedrij Amserdam [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 223 (H.L.).
147.
Wilson, 190.
148.
Ibid., 190.
149.
See The England [1973] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 373 at 383; approved by Lord Brandon in The Marion [1984] 1 AC 563, 577.
150.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 928. See The Niagara. 1944 A.M.C. 1307, 1312 (B.C.S.C.).
151.
1951 A.M.C. 320 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d per curiam, Continental Ins. Co. v. United States 195 F.2d 527, 1952 A.M.C. 669 (2nd Cir.).
152.
[1961] A.C. 807, [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 57.
153.
Ibid., 872.
154.
Wilson, 189.
155.
Ibid. 189.
156.
Ibid., 189–190; Girvin, 425.
157.
[2006] EWHC 122 (Comm); [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 649.
158.
Girvin, 425.
159.
Ibid., 425.
160.
Ibid., 425.
161.
Sánchez Calero, Vol. 170, 323–324.
162.
Ibid., 323–324.
163.
See The Black Gull, 250 F.2d 777, 1958 A.M.C. 277 (2nd Cir.); second appeal, 269 F.2d 68, 1960 A.M.C. 163 (2nd Cir.); Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 899, see The Kapitan Sakharov [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255, 266 (C.A.).
164.
Longley, 43.
165.
Sánchez Calero, Vol. 170, 324.
166.
Ibid., 324.
167.
Ibid., 324; Longley, 43 citing The Folmina, 212 U.S. 354, 29 S. Ct. 363, 53 L.Ed. 546 (1909); The Pinellas, 45 F.2d 174, 1930 A.M.C. 1875 (4th Cir.); The Gonzenheim, 36 F 2d. 869, 1930 A.M.C. 122 (5th Cir.); The Negus, 298 Fed. 749, 1923 A.M.C. 625 (S.D.N.Y.); The Archer, 29 F2d. 134, 1928 A.M.C. 1615 (E.D.N.Y.); The Georgian, 4 F. Supp. 718, 1933 A.M.C. 1540 (S.D. Fla.), aff’d, 76 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1935). Also in the Complaint of Tecomar S.A., 765 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Navegacion Castro Riva, S.A. of Panama v. The Nordholm, 178 F. Supp. 736, 741 (E.D.La.1959) (“classification societies often continue vessels in class long after their highest and best use would be as scrap”), aff'd, 287 F.2d 398 (5th Cir.1961); Bank Line v. Porter, 25 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 623, 49 S.Ct. 25, 73 L.Ed. 544 (1928), (“certificate of surveyors disregarded where vessel found unseaworthy in fact”).
168.
Sánchez Calero, Vol. 170, 324.
169.
L.R. 3 App. Cas. 72.
170.
J. D. Lucas, Cases and materials on admiralty, University casebook series, 2nd edn. (Mineola N.Y: Foundation Press, 1978), 652.
171.
Clarke, 125.
172.
(1927) 27 Ll.L.Rep. 395, 396.
173.
[1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 180, 186.
174.
See The Waterville Victory, 1951 A.M.C. 320 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d per curiam, Continental Ins. Co. v. United States 195 F.2d. 527, 1952 A.M.C. 669 (2nd Cir.); See also The Pocone, 159 F.2d 661, 665, 1947 A.M.C. 306 (2nd Cir.); Mamiye v. Barber, 360 F.2d 774 (2nd Cir. 1966).
175.
171 U.S. 462, 19 S.Ct. 7, 43 L.Ed. 241 (1898).
176.
Lucas, 651.
177.
181 U.S. 218, 45 L.Ed.830, 21 S.Ct.591. (1901); Lucas, at 652: “The Court went on to reject the argument that despite the fact of unseaworthiness the condition arose from an error in the management within the Harter Act exemption, and similarly to reject the argument that the owner is responsible for the provision of a proper structure and equipment, and for the diligence of his “shore” personnel, but is not responsible for the negligence of his “sea” personnel through the negligence result in unseaworthiness before breaking ground.”
178.
See Philippine Sugar C. Agency v. Kokusai Kisen, Etc. (The Naples Maru) 106 F.2d 32, 1939 A.M.C. 1087 (2nd Cir.), at 34–35: “The standard of seaworthiness, like so many other legal standards, must always be uncertain, for the law cannot fix in advance those precautions in hull and gear which will be necessary to meet the manifold dangers of the sea.”
179.
Longley, 43.
180.
See Complaint of Tecomar S.A., 765 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151, 1155 (2nd Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959, 99 S. Ct. 1499, 59 L.Ed. 2d 772 (1979).
181.
See Tidmarsh v. Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 4 Mason 439, 441; 23 F. Cas. 1197, 1198 (C.C. Mass.).
182.
Baer, 501.
183.
Ibid., 501; See The Sagamore (1924), 300 Fed. 701, 1924 A.M.C. 961 (2nd Cir.), at 704: “The vessel may be perfectly seaworthy for cargo-carrying purposes around the harbour, and not seaworthy for oceanic carriage; and she may be seaworthy for the carriage of a load lumber, and not be seaworthy for a load of steel rails. The law implies a warranty by owner … of seaworthiness for the purposes for which the ‘Sagamore’ was chartered.”
184.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 899. See Mobil Shipping Transp. Co. v. Wonsild Liquid Carriers, 190 F. 3d 64, 69, 1999 A.M.C. 2719, 2710 (2nd Cir. 1999).
185.
Clarke, at 125: “Secondly, the warranty is said to be absolute: once the meaning of seaworthiness is ascertained, (relative, as above), in any particular case, the obligation of the carrier to ensure that his ship meets that relative standards is absolute.” See Carver No, 107; Scrutton, 80 ff.
186.
Ibid., 126.
187.
Ibid., 126.
188.
J. Bouvier, Bouvier's Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia, 3 rev. (being the eigth Edition) by Francis Rawle, 2 vols. (Kansas City, Mo.: Vernon Law Book Company, 1914), II, 3028.
189.
4 Mason 439, 23 F. Cas. 1197 (C.C. of Mass.).
190.
Ibid., 441 or 1198.
191.
19 F. 101 (D.C.N.Y 1883).
192.
191 U.S. 1, 24 S.Ct. 1, 48 L.Ed. 65 (1903).
193.
Ibid., 3 or 8. See supra note 124.
194.
Bouvier, II, 3028, See The Northern Belle, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 526, 19 L.Ed. 746; Palmer v. Ins. Co., 116 N.Y. 599, 23 N.E. 5.
195.
Baer, 500.
196.
Ibid, 500.
197.
598 F. Supp. 929, 934, 1985 A.M.C. 1606, 1612 (D.Md. 1984).
198.
Tetley, Interpretation and Construction…, 64.
199.
Clarke, 125, citing Carver, Carriage by Sea (12th ed.), London 1971, No. 109.
200.
[2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719, at para. 126.
201.
Longley, 44, citing The Ciprya, 137 F.2d 326, 1946 A.M.C 947 (2nd Cir); The Gonzenheim, 36 F.2d 869, 1930 A.M.C. 122 (5th Cir); Barge B.A. 1401. (Hampton Roads Carriers, Inc. v. Allied Chemical Corp.), 329 F2d. 387, 1964 A.M.C. 2458 (4th. Cir. 1964); The Roseina, 1937 A.M.C. 359 (S.D.N.Y.); The Anastasia, 11 F. Supp. 314, 1935 A.M.C. 579 (E.D.Va.).
202.
Ibid., at 48: “In The Pennsylvania, 1956 A.M.C. 1810 (D. Ore), it was held that a welded vessel was unseaworthy for winter voyage across the Pacific on which she was bound to be subjected to low temperatures which would accentuate the danger of fracture of the steel plates of her hull which were notch sensitive at low temperatures.”
203.
Ibid., 66.
204.
See Complaint of Tecomar S.A., 765 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); J. Gerber & Co. v. SS Sabine Howaldt, 437 F.2d 580, 596 (2nd Cir. 1971); New Rotterdam Ins. Co. v. The S.S. Loppersum, 215 F. Supp. 563, 567 (S.D.N.Y.1963).
205.
Complaint of TecomarS.A., see supra note 204.
206.
Wilson, 12.
207.
Gilmore and Black, JR., 151. See The Southwark, 191 U.S. 1, 24 S. Ct. 1 (1903); The Benjamin Noble, 244 F. 95, 97 (6th Cir. 1917) affirmed sub nom. Capitol Transp. Co. v. Cambria Steel Co. 249 U.S. 334, 39 S.Ct. 292 (1919); R. T. Jones Lumber Co. v. Roen S.S. Co., 270 F 2d. 456, 1960 A.M.C. 46 (2nd Cir. 1959).
208.
Ibid., 151.
209.
Bouvier, II, 3027. Sanford & Brooks Co. v. Columbia Dredging Co., 177 Fed. 878, 101 C.C.A. 92 (4th Cir. 1910).
210.
The Muncaster Castle [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 57; The Amstelslot [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 223; The Hellenic Dolphin [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 336.; The Friso [1980] 1 Lloyd´s Rep. 469; The Theodegmon [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 52.
211.
See Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co., v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1962] 2 QB 26; The Amstelslot [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 223.
212.
Longley, 49.
213.
Girvin, 386, citing The Toledo [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 40.
214.
Ibid. See The Turret Crown, 297 Fed. 766, 1924 A.M.C. 253 (2nd Cir.); The Seeger, 104 F.2d 167, 1939 A.M.C. 792 (2nd Cir.); The Ionian Pioneer, 236 F.2d 78, 1956 A.M.C. 175 (5th Cir.); The Naiwa, 3 F.2d 385, 1925 A.M.C., 85 (4th Cir.); Erie & St. Lawrence Corpotaration v. Barnes Ames Co., 52 F.2d 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1931).
215.
Ibid., 386. See Steel v. State Steamship Co. (1877) 3 App. Cas. 72.
216.
See Federazione Italiana v. Mandask Compania 388 F.2d 434. 1968 A.M.C. 315 (2nd Cir. 1962).
217.
The Torenia [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 210, 230 and 234.
218.
Ibid., 386. See Charles Brown & Co. v. Nitrate Producer Steamship Co. (1937) 58 LI.L.R. 188.
219.
Ibid., 386. See Hang Feng Shipping & Trading Co. Ltd. v. Mullion & Co. Ltd., [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 511, 524.
220.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 880.
221.
See Orient Mid-East Lines v. A Shipment of Rice, 496 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1974); Matter of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., S.A. 513 F. Supp. 148, 1981 A.M.C. 2350. (E.D.La.).
222.
SOLAS, STCW, Maritime Labor Convention of 2006.
223.
Longley, 54, citing The E. Madison Hall, 140 F.2d 589, 1944 A.M.C. 202 (4th Cir.); The Nancy Moran, 80 F. Supp. 623, 1948 A.M.C. 1609 (S.D.N.Y.); The Claribel, 1964 A.M.C. 957 (E.D.La.), 341 F.2d 956, aff´d 1965 A.M.C. 535 (5th Cir.); but See The Spartan, 47 F.2d 189, 1931 A.M.C. 1 (2nd Cir.).
224.
Wilson, 11. See The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd´s Rep 316; Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co., v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, [1962] 2 QB 26; The Farrandoc [1967] 2 Lloyd´s Rep. 276; Heinrich C. Horn v. Cia de Navegacion Fruco [1969] A.M.C. 1495.
225.
Schoenbaum and Yiannopoulos, 388.
226.
See Papera Traders Co. Limited & Others v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Limited, The Keihin Co. Limited, [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719.
227.
Also in The Makedonia, [1962] Lloyd’s Rep. 316, 337.
228.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 892. See Robin Hood Flour Mills Ltd. v. NM Paterson & Sons Ltd. (The Farrandoc), [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 276, 282.
229.
Ibid., 892.
230.
[1962] 1 Lloyd´s Rep. 316.
231.
Clarke, 216.
232.
Longley, 55, citing The Pinellas, 45 F.2d 174, 1930 A.M.C. 1875 (4th Cir.). See also The Hong Kong Fir, [1962] 2 QB 26.
233.
Clarke, 216, citing The Makedonia, supra note 230, at 336.
234.
Longley, 55, citing The Mountoswald, 15 Lloyd’s List L. Rep. 144 (C.A.1923), about a master well experienced and with years of license was frequently intoxicated, situation widely known and because of that, the vessel was held unseaworthy.
235.
See The Condor, The Nordpol, 84 F.2d 3, 1936 A.M.C. 1010 (2nd Cir.); in re Pacific Mail S.S. Co. 130 Fed. 76 (9th Cir. 1904).
236.
Girvin, 387. citing State Trading Corp. of India v. Doyle Carrier Inc. (The Jute Express) [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 55; Rio Tinto Co. Ltd. v. The Seed Shipping Co. Ltd. (1926) 24 LI. L.R. 316.
237.
Bouvier, II, 3028. See Draper v. Commercial Ins. Co., 4 Duer (N.Y.) 234; Holland v. Seven Hundred & Twenty-Five Tons of Coal, 36 Fed. 784 (D.C.E.D.Wis).
238.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 891.
239.
(The Clan Gordon) [1924] AC 100, 120–21.
240.
The Makedonia, see supra note 230.
241.
[1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 159.
242.
Ibid., 168. As quoted by Clarke, 216, citing also The Farrandoc [1967] 2 Lloyd´s Rep. 276.
243.
Standard Oil Co. v. The Clan Line (The Clan Gordon), see supra note 239; The Farrandoc, see supra note 242; The Star Sea, [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 360, 374, (operation of the CO² fire-fighting system).
244.
The Elkton 49 F.2d 700, 1931 A.M.C. 1040 (2nd Cir.).
245.
See Standard Oil Co. v. The Clan Line (The Clan Gordon), see supra note 239.
246.
In the The Farrandoc, [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 276, at 282, the Canadian Exchequer Court held on this aspect that: “Even after making such inquiries he would, in my opinion, inquire how far the man’s experience fitted him for the service in the particular ship and take steps to see that the man was adequately instructed with respect to any features of the particular ship with which it was necessary for him to be familiar to properly discharge the duties of his position and to avoid damage to the ship and ger cargo.”
247.
See supra note 230.
248.
See The Star Sea, [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 360, 374.
249.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 891.
250.
See Matter of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., S.A., 513 F. Supp. 148, 158, 1981 A.M.C. 2350 (E.D.La.).
251.
See The Cygnet, 126 F. 742 (1st Cir. 1903); In McGill v. Michigan Steamship Co., 144 F. 788 (9th Cir. 1906); Matter of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., S.A. 513 F. Supp. 148, 159. 1981 A.M.C. 2350 (E.D.La.).
252.
Matter of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., S.A., see supra note 251.
253.
The Makedonia, see supra note 230 at 335.
254.
Longley, 50.
255.
Ibid., 50. See The Claribel, 1964 A.M.C. 967 (E.D. La.), 341 F.2d 956, 1965 A.M.C. 535 (5th Cir.). Also in U.S. v. Ultramar Shipping Co., Inc., 685 F. Supp. 887, 1988 A.M.C. 527 (S.D.N.Y., 1987), quoting at 899 2A Benedict on Admiralty § 67.
256.
Ibid., 50. See The W.W. Bruce, 94 F.2d 834, 1938 A.M.C. 232 (2d Cir.); The Maria, 91 F.2d 819, 1937 A.M.C. 934 (4th Cir.); The Maria, 15 F. Supp. 745, 1936 A.M.C. 1314 (S.D.N.Y.); Trinidad Shipping Co. v. Frame Alston Co. 88 Fed. 528 (S.D.N.Y.1898); The Glenville, 1962 A.M.C. 2311 (S.D. Tex.); but See The Silverway, 15 F.2d 648, 1926 A.M.C. 1645 (5th Cir.). Also in U.S. v. Ultramar Shipping Co., Inc. see supra note 255, quoting at 899 2A Benedict on Admiralty § 67.
257.
Girvin, 387, citing Parsons Corp. v. CV Scheepvaatonderneming (The Happy Ranger) [2006] EWHC 122; [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 649.
258.
136 U.S. 408, 10 S.Ct. 934, 34 L.Ed. 398.
259.
Ibid., at 425 or 938: “If the compass on the new iron vessel was not sufficiently protected to traverse correctly, the vessel was as little sea worthy as if she had no compass, and this should have been carefully ascertained before she started on her voyage. If there was no fault in the compass, then it is very evident that the officer, who is 30 or 40 miles wrong in his calculation, and driving through a thick fog with a full head of steam, and first discovers his true position by running on an island, a cape, or a continent, has neither the skill nor the prudence to be intrusted with such a command; and for want of such an officer the vessel is not seaworthy.”
260.
See Paterson Steamship Ltd. v. Robin Hood Mills (1937) 58 LI.L.R. 33.
261.
See Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. 27,946 Long Tons of Corn, 830 F.2d 1321, 1324, 1326. (5th Cir. 1987).
262.
265 F. Supp. 595, 1966 A.M.C. 2219 (S.D. Cal. 1966), upheld in 414 F.2d 724, 1969 A.M.C. 1682, [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 437 (9th Cir. 1969).
263.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 913.
264.
See U.S. v. Ultramar Shipping, see supra note 255, at 899–900 or 545.
265.
1997 A.M.C. 1140, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
266.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 914.
267.
See Temple Bar 45 F. Supp. 608, 815, affirmed 137 F. 2d 293 (4th Cir. 1943); The Heddernheim 39 F. Supp. 558, 1941 A.M.C. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); The Aakre 122 F.2d. 469, 141 A.M.C. 1263 (2nd Cir. 1941).
268.
548 F.2d. 56, 1977 A.M.C. 780 (2nd Cir. 1977).
269.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 912.
270.
213 F. Supp. 352, 356–357, 1963 A.M.C. 649 (D.C.Or. 1962).
271.
See Irish Spruce (Irish Shipping Ltd. Lim. Procs.) 1975 A.M.C. 2259, 2568 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), reversed in appeal on other grounds, 548 F.2d. 56, 1977 A.M.C. 780 (2nd Cir. 1977).
272.
See Texaco North Dakota, Lim. Procs. 570 F. Supp. 1272, 1289, 1985 A.M.C. 1650, 1674 (E.D.La. 1983).
273.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 915.
274.
SOLAS: Consolidated text of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and its Protocol of 1988: Articles, annexes, and certificates, 5th edn. (London: International Maritime Organization, 2009) Chapter V, Regulation 19.
275.
Wilson, 12. See Tattersall v. National Steamship Co. (1984) 12 QBD 297; The Tres Flores [1973] 2 Lloyd´s Rep. 247.
276.
Ibid., 12; see Stanton v. Richardson (1874) 9 CP 390.
277.
Ibid., 12; see Cargo per Maori King v. Huges [1895] 2 QB 550.
278.
191 U.S. 1, 24 S. Ct. 1, 48 L.Ed. 65 (1903).
279.
Empresa Cubana Importadora de Alimentos Alimport v. Iasmos Shipping Co. S.A. [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 586, 592.
280.
Similar criterion was held in The Aquacharm [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 7, 9 (C.A.); The Gudermes [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 456, 472; The Subro Valour [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 509, 516.
281.
Bouvier, II, 3027. Harloff v. Barber & Co. 150 Fed. 185; Kish v. Taylor [1912] AC 604; The Friso [1980] 1 Lloyd´s Rep. 469.
282.
Ibid., 3027.
283.
Longley, 54, citing The Sagamore, 300 Fed. 701, 1924 A.M.C. 961 (2d Cir.); The Indien, 5 F. Supp. 349, 1933 A.M.C. 1342 (S.D. Cal.), 71 F.2d 752, 1934 A.M.C. 1050 (9th Cir.); Wellesly v. Hooper, 185 Fed. 733 (9th Cir. 1911); The Vestris, 60 F.2d 273, 1932 A.M.C. 863 (S.D.N.Y.); Petition of T.J. Howard, 53 F. Supp. 556, 1943 A.M.C. 1263 (E.D.N.Y.), 155 F.2d 780 (2nd Cir. 1946); The Sea Rambler, 83 Lloyd’s List L. Rep. 84 (K.B. Div. 1949).
284.
Ibid. See The Horaisan Maur, 73 F.2d 526, 1925 A.M.C. 96 (2nd Cir.).
285.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 918. See The Friso, [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 469, 476.
286.
Ibid., 918.
287.
Ibid. See Nuzzo v. Rederi A/S Wallenco 304 F.2d 506, 508, 1962 A.M.C. 1871, 1874 (2nd Cir. 1962); Blommer Chocolate Co. v. Nosira Sharon Ltd. 776 F. Supp. 760, 776, 1994 A.M.C. 1807 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d 963 F.2d 1522 (2nd Cir. 1992); Sogem-Afrimet, Inc. v. M/V Ikan Selayang, 951 F. Supp. 429, 442, 1998 A.M.C. 1366, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
288.
Ibid., 919. Tetley mentions here that the obligation in the Article 3(2) of the HR is absolute, but in his chapter 26 properly dealing with this provision, says at page 1321 that this obligation “although a stringent one, is not absolute.”
289.
Ibid., 899. See The Apostolis, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 241, 257 (C.A.). See also R.T. Jones Lumber Co. v. Roen Steamship Co. 270 F.2d 456, 458, 1960 A.M.C. 46, 49 (2nd Cir. 1959); Mobil Shipping and Transp. Co. v. Wonsild Liquid Carriers Ltd. 190 F.3d 64, 69, 1999 A.M.C. 2710 (2nd Cir. 1999).
290.
M. D. Booker, Containers: Conditions, law and practice of carriage and use (London: Derek Beattie, 1987) Vol. 1, at xxvii: “Sealand were the pioneers in 1956 and by 1958 were operating six converted ships between New York and Puerto Rico. By April 1966 the first North Atlantic services had started between Boston and Rotterdam and the first shore-based cranes for transhipping containers had been installed.”; Talley, W. K., ‘Ocean Container Shipping: Impacts of a Technological Improvement’ (2000) 34, Journal of Economic Issues, 933–48, 933.
291.
See Leather Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 313 F. Supp., 1373, 1970 A.M.C. 1310 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), at 1376: “Containers are provided primarily for the convenience of the carrier, since they cut down handling time and can save as much as 90% of the time required for unloading and reloading a vessel.”
292.
S. Simon, ‘Latest Development in the Law of Shipping Containers’ (1973) 4, J. Mar. L. & Com., 441–54, 442, 447.
293.
S. Simon, ‘The Law of Shipping Containers: Part I: A Look at the Factual and Legislative Background, and a Critique of a New Judicial Formula.’ (1974) 5, J. Mar. L. & Com., 507–32, 512.
294.
Ibid., 513.
295.
Article II(1). “ ‘Container’ means an article of transport equipment:
1. (a)
  of permanent character and accordingly strong enough to be suitable for repeated use;
2. (b)
  specially designed to facilitate the transport of goods by one or more modes of transport, without intermediate reloading;
3. (c)
  designed to be secure and/or readily handled, having corner fittings for these purposes;
4. (d)
  Of size such that the area enclosed by the four outer bottom corners is either:
5. (i)
  at least 14 sq.m. (150sq.ft.) or
6. (ii)
  at least 7 sq.m. (75 sq.ft.) if it is fitted with top corner fitting;
the term ‘container’ includes neither vehicles nor packaging, however, containers when carried on chassis are included.”
296.
See Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gessellschaft, 373 F.2d 943, 1967 A.M.C. 881; Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. v. The Hong Kong Producer, 1969 A.M.C. 1741.
297.
Leather's Best, Inc. v. S. S. Mormaclynx, 451 F. 2d 800, 815, 1971 A.M.C. 2383, 15 Fed. R.Serv. 2d 651 (C.A.2, 1971).
298.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 921.
299.
See Mitsui & Co., Ltd. v. American Export Lines, Inc. 636 F.2d 807, 816, 1981 A.M.C. 331 (C.A.N.Y. 1981); Binladen BSB Landscaping v. M.V. Nedlloyd Rotterdam, 1985 A.M.C. 2113, 2120, 759 F. 2d 1006. 1012 (2nd Cir.).
300.
1977 A.M.C. 1382, 1401–1402 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff’d without opinion, 582 F.2d 1271 (2nd Cir. 1978).
301.
Ibid., 1398, 1401.
302.
Ibid., 1402. The carrier was held liable despite an improper packing of the cargo that caused damage to the container’s skin. Also the damage occurred during a storm in January in the North Pacific which was not considered peril of the sea because those are usual weather conditions.
303.
1991 A.M.C. 2356, 2361 (S.D.N.J.1991), aff’d 958 F.2d 362, 1992 A.M.C. 1520 and 1816 (3rd Cir. 1992).
304.
P.-J. Bordahandy, ‘Containers: a Conundrum or a concept?’ (2005) 11, The Journal of International Maritime Law, 342–71, 354. See CTI Container Leasing Corporation v. Oceanic Operations Corp. 652 F.2d 377, 1982 A.M.C. 2541 (2nd Cir. 1982).; Flexivan Leasing, Inc. v. M/V C.C. San Francisco 1986 A.M.C. 333.
305.
See Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 270, 97 S. Ct. 2348, 2360, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977).
306.
Binladen BSB Landscaping v. M.V. Nedlloyd Rotterdam 593 F. Supp. 546 (D.C.N.Y. 1984).
307.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 922.
308.
N. J. Margetson, ‘Liability of the carrier under the Hague (Visby) Rules for cargo damage caused by unseaworthiness of its containers’ (2008) 14, The Journal of International Maritime Law, 153–61, 157.
309.
Bordahandy, 356. See The River Rima [1987] 3 All ER 1 [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 106: [1988] 1WLR 758 [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 193, HL.
310.
Ibid., 356.
311.
Margetson, 157.
312.
Ibid., at 153. He refers to the decision of the Supreme Court of Netherlands in the NDS Provider of the 1 of February of 2008, nr C06/082 HR, published in RvdW 2008, 177.
313.
Bordahandy, at 357: “Thus the NSW[New South Wales] Court of Appeals in the TNT Express appears to have been inconsistent in both conceptualizing a container as ‘part of the ship’, thus implicitly extending to containers the carrier’s personal duty of seaworthiness and also requesting that shippers proceed to a reasonable inspections (for seaworthiness) of the container before loading.”
314.
Margetson, 161.
315.
See Du Pont de Nemours Inter, S.A. v. S.S. Mormacvega 493 F.2d 97, 102 1974 A.M.C. 67, (C.A.N.Y. 1974); Konica Business Machines, Inc. v. Vessel “Sea-Land Consumer” 153 F3d. 1076, 1078 (C.A. 9 (Cal.) 1998), 1998 A.M.C. 2705, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6955, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9595, citing the judgment of the first instance district court at 1996 WL 468770; Insurance Co. of North America v. Blue Star (North America), Ltd. Not reported in F. Supp., 1997 WL 345235 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), 1997 A.M.C. 2434.
316.
636 F.2d 807, 816, 1981 A.M.C. 331 (C.A.N.Y. 1981).
317.
Ibid., at 816: “… containers are typically supplied by the carrier, must be returned to the carrier by the consignee, and are used and reused hundreds of times. Many ships, including the S.S. Red Jacket, are so constructed that shipments must be made in containers. The shipper normally pays for the weight of the pallet but not for that of the container.” See also supra note 291 and accompanying text.
318.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 921.
319.
Ibid., 922.
320.
Ibid., 896.
321.
See McIver v. Tate Steamer [1903] 1 K.B. 362; Northumbrian Shipping Co. v. Trimm [1939] AC 397; Fiumana Societa di Navigazione v. Bunge & Co. Ltd. [1930] 2 K.B. 47.
322.
Bouvier, II, 3028.
323.
Girvin, 387, citing Rey Banano del Pacifico CA v. Transportes Navieros Ecuatorianos (The Isla Fernandina) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 15.
324.
See Cheikh Boutros Selim El-Khoury v. Ceylon Shipping Lines Ltd. (The Madeleine), [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 224, 241.
325.
See The Eurasian Dream supra note 84.
326.
Clarke, 127.
327.
[1959] AC 589 (PC).
328.
Ibid., 602.
329.
Ibid., 604.
330.
Schoenbaum, 894.
331.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 893.
332.
Ibid., 894.
333.
Clarke, 234, at 235: “The common law case establishing the notion of river stage is weak, but the common law rules show a remarkable capacity for survival and the common law solution, accepted by Carver, will probably prevail.”
334.
Ibid., 235.
335.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 894. See Orient Ins. Co. v. United S.S. Co. 1961 A.M.C. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
336.
Clarke, 126.
337.
SOLAS, STCW, etc.
338.
Clarke, 233, citing Zaphirou 1963 J.B.L. 221, 225.
339.
Ibid., 233, citing Götz 38 Can. B.R. 96, 98.
340.
Ibid., 233–34.
341.
See The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd´s Rep 316; Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1962] 2 QB 26.
342.
Clarke, 234.
343.
See Thin v. Richards, [1892] 2 QB 141 (C.A.) and The Vortigen, [1899] Prob. 140 (C.A.).
344.
Schoenbaum, 894. See United States v. American Trading Co. (The Glymont), 66 F.2d. 617 (2nd. Cir. 1933); The Steel Navigator, 23 F.2d. 590 (2nd Cir. 1928) (dicta); and, May v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Ppacketfahrt Aktiengesellschaft (The Isis), 290 U.S. 333, 54 S.Ct. 162, 78 L.Ed. 348 (1933).
345.
Girvin, 427, citing Leesh River Tea Co. Ltd. V. British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. [1967] 2 QB 250 (CA); The Makedonia, see supra note 230, at 160.
346.
As Lord Macmillian sets in Stag Line LTD v. Foscolo, Mango and Co. Ltd., See supra note 8, at 350.
347.
Ibid., 427.
348.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 896. The Fjord [1999] 1 Lloyd´s Rep. 307.
349.
Girvin, 427, citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cabaneli Naviera S.A. (The Theodegmon) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 52.
350.
Statement of Lord Blackburn in Steel v. State Steamship Co., (1877) 3 App. Cas. 72, 86, as quoted by Wilson, 9.
351.
See McFadden v. Blue Star Line (1905) 1 K.B. 697, 706.
352.
See Athenian Tankers Management S.A. v. Pyrena Shipping (The Arianna). [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 376, at 389: “…a prudent owner might well require even a trivial defect to be made good before sending his vessel to sea if, even in a remote contingency, that defect might jeopardize the safety of the vessel or its cargo, upon the basis that every defect, however small, that might do so, must, as a matter of prudence, be corrected before the vessel put to sea.”
353.
Clarke, 224, citing Diplock L.J.
354.
See Brown v. Nitrate Producers S.S. Co. (1937) 58 LI.L.R. 188, at 191 Lord Porter says: “The only question is whether by ‘latent’ it means that you have to use every possible method to discover whether (the defect) exists, or whether you must use reasonable methods. I cannot myself believe that in every case it is obligatory upon a ship’s officer on the commencement of a voyage to go and tap every rivet to find if it has a defect or not. If that were so, ships would be held up in port for a very long time while the rivets were being tapped…” as quoted by Clark at 225, citing also Cransfield Bros. v. Tatem S.N.Co. (1939) 64 LI.L.R. 264, 275; Guan Bee v. Palembang Shipping Co. [1969] 1 May L.J. 90, 91; M.D.C. v. N.V.Z.M. Beursstraat [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 180; The President Monroe [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 385, 386 (U.S. District Ct).
355.
[1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 336.
356.
Ibid., 346–347, as quoted by Clark at 225.
357.
Clarke, at 225: “In The Australia Star [(1940) 67 Ll.L.R. 110, 118], it was said that the removal of insulation from a refrigerated hold before every voyage to seek oil leakage from adjacent tanks would be impracticable on account of the expense involved.”
358.
Ibid., 228.
359.
Ibid., 179.
360.
32 M.P.R. 282.
361.
Ibid., 305–306, as quoted by Clarke, 179.
362.
Clarke, 179.
363.
See supra note 274.
364.
Clarke, 202, citing The Muncaster Castle [1961] A.C. 807 and The Lady Gwendolen [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 335.
365.
Ibid., 217.
366.
Ibid., 217, citing: The Assunzione [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 468, 487; Cranfield Bros. v. Tatem S.N.Co. (1939) 64 LI.L.R. 264, 267.
367.
Ibid., 219–220.
368.
Ibid., 220.
369.
[1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 210, 230.
370.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 880.
371.
Ibid., 878.
372.
Ibid., 878. See Scrutton on Charterparties 14 Ed. 1839, at 110: “In most cases of the vessel is unseaworthy due diligence cannot have been used by the owner, his servant or agents; if due diligence has been used the vessel will in fact be seaworthy. The circumstances in which the dilemma does not arise (e.g. a defect causing unseaworthiness but of so latent a nature that due diligence could not have discovered it) are not likely to occur often.” Also cited in The Muncaster Castle [1961] A.C. 807, at 873.
373.
[2000] 2 Lloyd´s Rep. 191, 205.
374.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 901. See Consolidated & Barge Co. v. Marcona Conveyor Corp., 716 F. 2d 1077, 1985 A.M.C. 117 (5th Cir. 1983).
375.
Ibid., 901, citing The Theodegmon [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 52, 77.
376.
See U.S. v. Ultramar Shipping supra note 255 at 897: “Any doubt as to the seaworthiness of the vessel ‘must be resolved against the ship owner and in favor of the shipper’”, citing also The Southwark see supra note 123 at 6 or 16.
377.
Clarke, 201–202.
378.
Ibid., 201.
379.
Girvin, 429.
380.
Schoenbaum, 897.
381.
Girvin, 429.
382.
Schoenbaum, 899.
383.
Ziegler, 145.
384.
Gilmore and Black, JR., 148–149. As the differences between the Harter Act and COGSA are mostly verbal and stylistic, American courts have frequently used decisions made under Harter act as reference when deciding cases under COGSA.
385.
Schoenbaum and Yiannopoulos, 388.
386.
179 U.S. 69, 21 S. Ct. 30, 45 L.Ed. 90.
387.
185 Fed. 396 (2nd Cir. 1911).
388.
Longley, 88.
389.
Ibid., 89.
390.
196 U.S. 589, 25 S.Ct. 317, 49 L.Ed. 610 (1905).
391.
Longley, 90.
392.
263 Fed. 559 (2nd Cir. 1920).
393.
Longley, 87. Similar considerations about ventilation were held in The Jean Bart 197 Fed. 1002 (D. Cal. 1911); The Edith (1926) 10 F.2d 684, 1926 A.M.C. 281 (2nd Cir.); and, the W.T. Locket & Co. v. Cunard S.A. Co. (1927) 21 F.2d 191, 1927 A.M.C. 1057 (E.D.N.Y.).
394.
Schnell & Co. v. S.S. Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296, 1934 A.M.C. 1573 (1934).
395.
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 903.
396.
Wilson, 191.
397.
Girvin, 430.
398.
Margetson, 160.
399.
Schoenbaum, 898.
400.
Ibid., 897.
401.
[1966] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 53, 1966 S.L.T. 253.
402.
Ibid., 254.
403.
Ibid., 254.
404.
Ibid., 254. See Renton v. Palmyra Trading Corporation of Panama [1957] A.C. 149, 166; The Eurasian Dream, supra note 797.
405.
Ibid., 256–257.
406.
Girvin, 431, citing Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd. v Malaysian International Shipping Corp. Bhd (The Bunga Seroja) [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 512 (HCA), at 143; Caltex Refining Co. Pty. V. BHP Transport Ltd. (The Iron Gippsland) [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 335, 337; Parsons Corp. v. CV Scheepvaatonderneming (The Happy Ranger) [2006] EWHC 122, [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 649.
407.
See Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Int’l, A.G., 881 F.2d 211, 1990 A.M.C. 402 (5th Cir. 1989); O’Connell Machinery Co. v. M/V Americana, 226 F.2d 1130, 1986 A.M.C. 2822 (2nd Cir. 1986); Lekas & Drivas v. Goulandris, 306 F.2d 426, 1962 A.M.C. 2366 (2nd Cir. 1962).
408.
See Intercontinental Trading Co. Inc. v- M/V Zenith Sun, 684 F. Supp. 861, 864 (E.D.Pa. 1988); The Poleric (Bank Line v. Porter), 25 F.2d 843, 1928 A.M.C. 761 (4th Cir. 1928); James Knott v. Botany Worsted Mills, 179 U.S. 69, 21 S.Ct. 30, 45 L.Ed. 90 (1900). A similar view is held under English law, See The “Mekhanik Evgrafov” and “Ivan Derbenec”, [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 634.
409.
Pyrene Co. Ltd. v. Scindia Navigation Co. Ltd. [1954] 2 QB 402, 418.
410.
Baatz, Michael Tsimplis “Obligation of the Carrier”, 37. Citing Jindal Iron Steel Co Ltd and others v. Islamic Soldarity Shipping Co Jordan Inc. (The Jordan II) [2005] 1 Lloyds Rep 57; Balli Trading Ltd v. Afalona Shipping Co. Ltd. (The Coral) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1.
411.
Ibid., 37.
412.
Girvin, 431.
413.
FIO: free in and out; FIOS: free in and out, stowed; FIOST free in and out, stowed and trimmed.
414.
See Jindal Iron & Steel Co. v. Islamic Solidarity Shipping Co. see supra note 410. Also in The Arawa [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 416, 424—5; GH Renton & Co. Ltd. v. Palmyra Trading Corporation of Panama [1957] AC 149.
415.
655 F. Supp.1435, 1988 A.M.C. 1787 (W.D.Ky. 1987), at 1438: “…the inclusion of an FIOS term in the bill of lading should not be disregarded as inconsistent with the COGSA so long as it is understood that the term in no way relieves the carrier of responsibility for its own acts or for the acts of other under its control”.
416.
Schoenbaum, 896, note 2. See Metals & Mineral Corp. v. M/N Arktis Sky, 978 F 2d. 47, 1993 A.M.C. 509 (2nd Cir.1992), and Atlas Assur. Co. v. Harper, Robinson Shipping Co., 508 F.2d 1381, 1975 A.M.C. 2358, 2689 (9th Cir. 1975).
417.
Girvin, 431.
418.
Ibid., 432.
419.
Schoenbaum, 897. See Nichimen Company v. M/V Farland, 462 F. 2d. 319, 1972 A.M.C. 1573 (2nd Cir. 1972).
420.
Honnold, 98–99. See Schoembaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law (1987), 237; 2A Benedict on Admiralty § 11 (7th Ed. 1992); Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol. 1, 398–399, 404–406, 408–410.
421.
The Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719.

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Chacón, V.H. (2017). The Obligation of Practicing Due Diligence in the Carriage of Goods by Sea. In: The Due Diligence in Maritime Transportation in the Technological Era. Springer Series on Naval Architecture, Marine Engineering, Shipbuilding and Shipping, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66002-8_3

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